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ABSTRACT
The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War:
The Impact of International Intervention in a Regional Conflict
Jeffrey Scott Passage

This thesis examines the role of international intervention in the area formerly known as
Yugoslavia during its collapse in the first half of the 1990s (1991-1995). The Cold War had just
ended, and the United Nations (UN), NATO, and the nations they represented were reevaluating
their roles in a world without competition between two superpowers. The collapse of
Yugoslavia and ensuing civil war presented these international bodies with an opportunity to
intervene and show that they were ready to take charge in future conflicts in pursuing and
achieving peace. However, what followed revealed them to be short-sighted and ill-prepared for
this role as the conflict quickly escalated leading to genocide again taking place in Europe.
The country of Bosnia, which emerged as its own nation in the collapse of Yugoslavia,
will receive special interest due to its place as the geographic and active center of most of the
war and atrocities. The United States will also be examined in detail since it eventually played a
key role in achieving peace with the Dayton Peace Accords.
The purpose of this study was to determine whether the intervention in Bosnia and former
Yugoslavia was implemented well. After examining primary documents from the United States,
the UN, NATO and other organizations, as well as secondary documents in the form of journal
articles and books, it became clear that the intentions of these groups were good, but their
abilities in achieving peace were not. Many leaders were highly influenced by prior experiences
in either World War II or Vietnam which made it difficult for them to see this new conflict in a
different light. Thus, it was only when key figures in leadership changed that the situation in
Bosnia was turned around and peace became attainable. Unfortunately, this peace was only
achieved after hundreds of thousands had died and millions had been displaced creating a
difficult rebuilding and reunifying process for those that remained or returned following Dayton.

Keywords: Bosnian War, international intervention, genocide, foreign policy, Cold War, Bosnia,
Croatia, Serbia, Yugoslavia,
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“Those who practice diplomacy need constantly to be reminded of the human damage their
efforts, or lack of them, can cause.” – Warren Zimmerman, last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia

“All that is necessary for evil to triumph in the world is for good people to do nothing.” Edmund Burke

INTRODUCTION
Agression is the name we give to the crime of war. We know the crime because of our
knowledge of the peace it interrupts—not the mere absence of fighting, but peace-withrights, a condition of liberty and security that can exist only in the absence of aggression
itself. The wrong the aggressor commits is to force men and women to risk their lives for
the sake of their rights. It is to confront them with the choice: your rights or (some of)
your lives!1 – Michael Walzer
The country of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia) is a young and predominantly unknown
nation in the United States. It lies to the east of the Adriatic Sea and is made up of slightly less
acreage than the state of West Virginia. Despite its small size, Bosnia became the focus of the
world’s attention between 1992 and 1995 as forces conspired to destroy its multiethnic
configuration. This led to the international community inserting itself into the ordeal in order to
try to stop the bloodshed, and it set the stage for the United Nations, NATO, the United States,
and the European Community (EU) to reevaluate their roles following the end of the Cold War.
Far from a perfect intervention, the ensuing war and peace negotiations revealed the weaknesses
of international intervention as negotiations floundered and hundreds of thousands of Bosnians
died. This paper will critique the responses of the UN, NATO, and the U.S. to the collapse of
Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia in order to facilitate a better understanding of what went
wrong. The intervention was largely a failed effort with success only coming four years after the
war began, and it took a number of changes in leadership and tactics along with a major tragedy
in order to achieve that success.
Intervention by the international community under the United Nations and NATO in the
Bosnian War has been viewed as a major success for those who helped end the violence.
However, the United Nations failed to act quickly, and severely, in punishing the aggressors of
the conflict. Failing to do so allowed the situation to whirl out of control and genocide once
1
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again took place on European soil. A general lack of understanding of the differing cultures
represented by the opposing sides of the conflict also led to many poor decisions being made
throughout the process. Peace was achieved, but the cost was high to the inhabitants of all the
republics of former Yugoslavia, and especially Bosnia, due to the wavering which took place on
the part of the international community. This is why the United States and its international allies
in the UN and NATO must not linger only on the good that came out of the conflict. Their
successes, as well as their failures, must be investigated in order to ensure that any future
conflicts like this one will not share the same fate.
The first focus of this paper will be to examine the role of the international community in
its attempt to bring peace to the region. Despite eventually achieving peace, the process by
which that peace was achieved was riddled with mistakes over far too long a period of time.
Promises were made and broken. Aggressors were rewarded to the bereavement of their victims.
Even the final peace which was achieved at the Dayton Peace Accords in December of 1995 can
be scrutinized for allowing some of the greatest protagonists of the violence a seat at the table
adding legitimacy to their rule despite the crimes that had been perpetrated under their
leadership. Therefore the international community, especially the members of the United
Nations, holds some responsibility for what transpired in former Yugoslavia. The greatest
tragedy is that they had the power to act and while they eventually achieved great success, they
did not respond soon enough.
Secondly, there will be a focus on the role of the United States and the way in which its
leadership in the 1990s handled intervention. The collapse and beginning of hostilities in
Yugoslavia began during President George H.W. Bush’s tenure in office and continued into Bill
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Clinton’s—making it a relevant topic of debate during the 1992 election and in each of the
administrations. Thus, both administrations must be examined carefully.
The U.S. was also in a unique position following the end of the Cold War. The buildup
of arms during the Cold War had given the U.S. great military might and a huge international
presence. In addition, this was the first instance in which a regional conflict in Europe was
spiraling out of control, and the European members of the UN desired to take the lead. Both
presidents of the U.S. were willing to yield to Europe in this situation since the U.S. no longer
possessed any national interests in former Yugoslavia outside of those it shared with the UN in
keeping the general peace. However, prior to the Cold War ending the situation might have
looked different as Yugoslavia had previously been of great interest to the U.S. as a Communist
nation that had chosen not to align with Stalin or his Soviet heirs. But the collapse of the Soviet
Union took away that one advantage it held, thus, lessening U.S. interest.
Grace must also be given to the international community. The situation was more
complicated than do something or do nothing. The Cold War had just ended. The United States
and other Western powers were redefining their functions without the existence of a second
superpower in the world. Getting involved with a conflict, especially an overseas one could be
politically dangerous, and there were many other complexities involved. However, the fact
remained that war in Yugoslavia was in no person or country’s best interest, least of all the
citizens of the six republics. Therefore, more attention should have been given to the events
leading up to the war in the form of diplomacy and ensuring different voices would be heard in
order to try to stave off disaster.
In summary, the Bosnian War and its conclusion have been viewed as a major success for
those who mediated and helped end the violence. Nevertheless, the errors made should not be
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excluded from the record by what was ultimately accomplished with the end of the war.
Mistakes were made, and it is the responsibility of the nations which ultimately helped end the
war to recognize those mistakes and learn from them in order to ensure that history does not
repeat itself again. Thus, this paper will stand as a testament to the successes and failures of the
international community, and specifically the UN and U.S., with the intention of bringing out a
clearer understanding of how international groups and the U.S. might respond in the future to
assure peace and action under similar circumstances.
Context and Overview
Prior to 1992, Bosnia had not experienced national independence since losing it in 1527
BCE to the Ottoman Empire. For the next 465 years, Bosnia was subject to the rise and fall of
empires pulling its strings. Due to the Slavic origin of its population, Bosnia was clumped in
with the other ethnic-Slavs in the Balkans in what would eventually be named the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia at the end of World War I and again in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
following World War II.2 In both the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the communist federation of
Yugoslavia, Bosnia existed as its own republic under first a monarch and then a strong,
centralized government. Yet throughout these 465 years, the people of Bosnia adapted and
added to their culture many aspects of all those empires that ruled them. This identity would
reach its apex in the form of nationalistic fervor in the years leading up to declaring
independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in December of 1991.
However, what should have been a time for celebration became a burden instead, as external and
internal forces combined to tear the country apart.

2
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differences including their religions and culture.
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Conflict over the future form of Yugoslavia quickly escalated to violence. Negotiations
broke down between the republics and those who remained unaffiliated with either side of the
conflict were eventually forced to choose between the two. Bosnia, the greatest example of a
multiethnic republic prior to the fighting, became the center of the worst atrocities as ethnic
tensions were encouraged by those saying heterogeneous societies could never work. Leaders
promoting homogeneous societies brought war to Bosnia soil, and from this point on ending the
war in Yugoslavia became synonymous with ending the war in Bosnia.
Amidst the fighting that took place within Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, both soldiers
and civilians were killed. Many died in battle, but the large majority of casualties were victims
of a genocide perpetrated by bigoted leaders in pursuit of their own homogeneous societies.
They facilitated this by using historical accounts of past wrongs committed against their specific
ethnic group provoking those that were more radical to commit some of the worst crimes against
humanity in Europe since World War II. These included genocide, systematic rape, and
detention camps. The most egregious example of genocide occurred in Srebrenica, a United
Nations declared “safe zone” where conservative estimates stated more than 8,000 Muslim men
and boys were massacred in a matter of days. It was in the wake of these tragedies that
spectators began to recall the horrific acts of the Holocaust as human beings were again rounded
up and executed in mass on European soil. That genocide could again take place in Europe was
difficult to comprehend, yet what was even more incomprehensible was that the United Nations
was present from the beginning with the goal of finding a peaceful solution.
The collapse of Yugoslavia, and the horrific acts committed by the different sides, set the
stage for a redefining of international law and order. The Soviet Union had only recently
collapsed, and the United States, NATO, and the United Nations were determining what their
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roles would be without the existence of a second superpower in the world. Each of their actions
in Bosnia would be a testament to how future crises might play out. In this conflict, the U.S. and
the countries represented by the UN and NATO pursued a cooperative effort to achieve peace,
with the Europeans taking the lead. Unfortunately this led to a drawn out engagement and the
questioning of UN policy-making in crisis situations.
The questioning of the UN derived in part from dissatisfaction regarding the depth and
duration in which abuses were allowed to continue. Prior to war breaking out or independence
from Yugoslavia being claimed by any of the republics, Helsinki Watch (now known as Human
Rights Watch3) recommended in its 1990 World Report “that economic sanctions be used against
the federal government of Yugoslavia and, when possible, against the government of the republic
of Serbia” due to its involvement “in egregious human rights abuses in the province of Kosovo4.”
The report also highlighted the situation in Croatia and the other republics as potential sites of
future “explosive human rights situations.”5 This report could not have been more accurate.
Dissatisfaction also derived from the clarity and accessibility of events taking place in
Bosnia to those outside the country and region of Bosnia, specifically the political leaders of the
international community, as “no other atrocity campaign in the twentieth century was better
monitored and understood by the U.S. government” and its allies in the UN and NATO.6 The
citizens of the US and UN nations could watch events unfold and even listen to them in near real
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time during the war. In doing so, both leaders and the public at large were forced to ask
themselves “how much human suffering are we prepared to watch before we intervene?”7 The
record of the Bosnian War revealed that sum of human suffering to be high.
Historiography
The breadth of literature about the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War is still in
its infancy as new details continue to emerge about this period. The New York Times offered
great coverage of the conflict as it panned out in Yugoslavia. As a prestigious newspaper, it
represented the information the American public had access to in its reporting of local, national,
and international news. It also presented a good timeline of events. Coupled with books and
journal articles from a wide spectrum of journals which have focused on the explanation of the
conflict and its roots, the larger conflict in Yugoslavia and the specific violence in Bosnia can be
brought to a greater understanding. What is certain is that the international community should
have intervened in a more radical fashion earlier in the conflict in order to avoid the
humanitarian crisis and war that followed. Instead they spent months, then years, debating what
the right course of action would be while the situation became direr.
There are two historiographical debates which exist regarding the Bosnian War. The first
debate is over who deserves blame in and for the war itself of the three sides involved: Bosnian,
Croatian, and Serbian.8 In this debate, one argument holds that the Serbs deserve all blame for
what happened and anything done by the Croatian or Bosnian sides was in response to an action
by the Serbs. The other side of the argument is that each ethnic group shares some blame since
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Both Franjo Tudjman, the leader of Croatia, and Slobodan Milosevic, the leader of Serbia and
Montenegro, pursued the possibility of taking parts of Bosnia for themselves in their pursuit of ethnically
homogeneous nations. Thus, even though the worst of the fighting began in Croatia, an eventual stalemate between
Serbian and Croatian forces there led to the fighting spilling over and intensifying in Bosnia where Bosnian Muslims
were added into the mix.
8
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each group at some point committed actions outside the rules of war and humanity against the
“others,” and none of them were initially willing to yield at the negotiating table. This is the
debate that is most fiercely contested between the ethnic groups of Bosnia today as they look
back on the events of the Bosnian War and try to make sense of what happened and why.
The second debate is the positive or negative role that the international community in the
form of the United Nations played in brokering a peace agreement and bringing the war in
Bosnia to its end. Since the war ended, there have been numerous books and articles that have
critiqued how events transpired and what could have been done differently, and overwhelmingly
the role of the international community is viewed in a negative light. Thus, the debate is less
over whether the UN had a positive or negative role, and instead is focused on the degree to
which the international community contributed to the creation of a prolonged and muddled peace
brokering and whether more action should or could have been taken. The debate also takes into
account the role of the U.S.—both in its position as the sole superpower and in whether it could
have done more to negotiate a change in UN policy. It is the argument of this paper that the
United Nations handled intervention poorly until it was pushed by the Clinton administration to
respond to Serbian aggression with force. Therefore, Clinton and his advisors deserve some
praise for finally pursuing a harsher response when terms were broken; however, both the U.S.
and the UN remain guilty of failing to act with such force earlier. This failure to act is what
allowed hostilities to increase among all three ethnic groups and nations, and it only became
worse as the aggressors became ever more emboldened by UN inaction.
Since this paper primarily focuses on the international community in the form of the U.S.,
the EC, the UN and NATO, the second historiographical debate is of principal concern.
However, it is important to state that this paper holds that the Serbs, and specifically the Bosnian
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Serbs and military under the control of President Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Radovan
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic in Bosnia, were the primary perpetrators of the war in Bosnia,
though not the exclusive participants in crimes committed against humanity.
In identifying specific problems in international intervention, one must first realize that
determining international policy is no easy thing when delving into a new situation that is
different from any other that has ever taken place before. There were many individual countries
and international groups that had a hand in determining policy for brokering a peace settlement.
This made it difficult to come to decisive actions quickly. Further complicating matters, the
collapse of Yugoslavia presented a new and frightening challenge for the UN, especially as war
broke out first in Slovenia and Croatia and only then spread to Bosnia. The purposes set forth by
the UN charter clearly demonstrated that the UN had an obligation to act in order “to maintain
international peace and security,” and it was quick to involve itself in the peace process because
of this. However, what took place following this initial response is where the debate over just
how poorly the situation in Bosnia was handled begins.
The War in Bosnia lasted almost four years with hundreds of thousands of lives lost, the
country’s infrastructure almost entirely destroyed, and many of the worst atrocities taking place
late in the peace process. Thus, it is easy for one to understand why the international community
has taken criticism for its role there. Out of this criticism come different views over just how
strongly fault should rest on the UN and whether others, like the U.S., deserve to be grouped in
with the UN as well.
The firmest proponent for placing most of the fault on the UN and all of the “West” is
David Rieff , a New York journalist, author and policy analyst. He states that, “Bosnia was and
always will be a just cause. It should have been the West’s cause. To have intervened on the
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side of Bosnia would have been self-defense, not charity.”9 He takes this even further when he
says that:
What has taken place in Bosnia has revealed the bankruptcy of every European security
institution, from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Council on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, exposed the fact that nowhere in these great structures was there
either intellectual preparedness or moral fortitude for dealing with the crises of the postCold War world or for coming to terms with the likelihood that in the future a great many
wars will take place not between states but within states.10
Thus, according to Rieff, the international community’s leadership failed to understand the
changing world which allowed for it to be completely unprepared for engagements like Bosnia.
Warren Zimmerman, the United States’ last ambassador to Yugoslavia before its demise,
took a slightly less firm stance on the failure of the international community than Rieff in his
book Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers. In the book he places blame on
the UN, NATO and the U.S. for how peace was pursued, but he also points to the leaders of the
republics and ethnic parties as the main protagonists in destroying their own nations.
Another side of the debate considers the specific role of the United States. Samantha
Power, a journalist at the time of the Bosnian War, examined the response of the US to the acts
of genocide which took place in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the world. In her research,
she became critical of the US leadership saying that
the personalities and geopolitical constraints influencing U.S. decision-making have
shifted with time, but the United States has consistently refused to take risks in order to
suppress genocide. The United States is not alone. The states bordering genocidal
societies and the European powers have looked away as well. Despite broad public
consensus that genocide should “never again” be allowed, and a good deal of
triumphalism about the ascent of liberal democratic values, the last decade of the
twentieth century was one of the most deadly in the grimmest century on record.”11

9
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Essentially, little had changed since World War II in terms of effective international intervention
in conflicts, and the U.S. especially needed to be held accountable for having the power to act
but not doing so until it was too late.
Similar to Power’s position, Wayne Bert, a former policy analyst for the Defense
Department, took a critical look at U.S. involvement and determined that the U.S. had a duty to
take the lead yet forfeited that duty in the interests of its relationship with the other members of
the UN and NATO. This then led to a prolonged engagement. In his book, The Reluctant
Superpower, he criticized the international community in the form of the UN and its European
members for their failure to resolve the war while leading the peace process. Bert also detailed
some of the good ideas that the U.S. leadership had and failed to promote strongly enough in
order to show that the U.S. was complicit in the initial failure of the peace process.
The final individual who demonstrated a unique perspective on the role of the U.S. in the
Bosnian War was Richard Holbrooke. Holbrooke served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
Europe between 1994 and 1996 and brokered the Dayton Peace Accords in Ohio. In his book,
To End A War, he considered the role of the U.S. in a more positive light by looking at what was
achieved to bring the war to an end. According to his experience, Europe and the UN achieved
little in their negotiating which only made the Serb aggressors act more boldly in defying the
UN’s peacekeeping mission. The U.S. leadership then took a risk by taking over the negotiation
process. That risk paid off, and Holbrooke praised the U.S. leadership for its willingness to act
in achieving a final peace settlement at Dayton. However, he also pointed out that this action
came too late and that there was a certain amount of luck involved in the outcome.
The most comprehensive book on U.S. foreign policy throughout the 1990s came from
Pulitzer Prize-winning author, journalist and historian David Halberstam in his book War in a
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Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals. No other writer better understood the inner
workings of Presidents Bush and Clinton and their staff. Much of his work stemmed from
personal interviews with the individuals themselves, and the book gave a very detailed account
of the complexity of the situation that the collapse of Yugoslavia and ensuing war represented.
The details did not distract from an incredible understanding of the big picture either. Bosnia
was a major focus of foreign policy for the U.S., but it was not the only one. Halberstam
approached the roles of the two U.S. administrations and their European counterparts in the UN
and NATO in terms of where they placed foreign policy as a priority. He then broke down how
that was changed by the individuals that were making the decisions throughout the 1990s and
how events affected them. According to Halberstam, there were no larger than life individuals
that single-handedly ended the war. There were merely the right and wrong people for getting
the job done, and the presidents, their civilian staff, and their military staff only found those
people through trial and error.
Other individuals writing about the conflict did so without focusing on the negative or
positive aspects of international intervention. Instead, they merely detailed many of the major
events of Yugoslavia’s collapse and the Bosnian War. The first of these was Noel Malcolm, an
English historian, writer and columnist who has devoted himself to Bosnia and currently chairs
the Board of Trustees for the Bosnian Institute.12 As a foreign advocate of Bosnia and its people,
Malcolm addressed the history well in giving his readers perspective on Bosnia’s history with the
emphasis being on education about the country and its origins. His insight gave the war
historical context rather than just describing the war as a lone event in time.
12

The Bosnian Institute is a key organization internationally in providing education and information on the
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neighbours. - Citation from Bosnian Institute Website’s ‘About Us’ Page, http://www.bosnia.org.uk/
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The final figure that bears mentioning in the historiography of the Bosnian War is Misha
Glenny. Glenny is a British journalist who traveled between the republics as Yugoslavia fell
apart and actually met many of the major figures in person during his travels and he has made his
career writing about the Balkans. In both The Balkans and The Fall of Yugoslavia, Glenny
breaks down all the republics of former Yugoslavia and the nations that surrounded them in
order to better understand the histories of each place. In The Fall of Yugoslavia he does this best
in looking at the different leaders involved in the conflict and defending Bosnia due to its
location between the two larger perpetrators, Croatia and Serbia, but not absolving it of some of
the guilt. Glenny’s personal experience helped him contribute greatly to the history of Bosnia
and the Balkans at large.
Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia all had a hand in the destruction of Bosnia, but the Serbian
and Bosnian Serb leadership, and to a lesser extent the Croatian leadership, committed the
majority of offenses in perpetrating crimes on the Bosnian civilian population and repeatedly
defied the international community and the peace negotiations. It also holds that the United
Nations committed a great number of blunders—the worst of which was allowing for the
Bosnian War to go on for so long without acting strongly to counter Serbian aggression. This
then allowed for the turmoil in Croatia to spread into Bosnia. Finally, the United States, while
considering solutions that later proved to be successful in bringing hostilities to an end, was
complicit because it failed to firmly promote any new actions with its European allies that were
leading the negotiations. U.S. reluctance to back up its words with physical actions condemned
it. However, in doing so it preserved a good standing internationally in a time in which great
change was taking place and any brash actions might have unsettled the work that was taking
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place with Russia and other countries that appeared on the surface to be moving away from
communism.
A Brief History of Twentieth Century Yugoslavia
Any study of Bosnia in the U.S. must begin with a short history of Yugoslavia in order to
facilitate a greater understanding of how the various wars in the 1990s were not unprecedented to
observers of Yugoslavia in the twentieth century. Yugoslavia as it was known up until the
beginning of the 1990s was a relatively recent creation in terms of its history as a nation, even at
the end of the twentieth century. “Yugoslavia was created in 1918 out of the shambles of World
War I, and by the collapse of two empires: the Hapsburgs in the northwest and the Ottomans in
the southeast. On the territory of modern Yugoslavia, only Serbia and Montenegro were
independent of the two empires before 1918.”13 It was first known as the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes following World War I, and was literally a creation by the victors at the
end of the War.14
Though they shared a common Slavic ancestry, the groups making up the new kingdom
actually possessed many differences along ethnic, religious, cultural, and historical lines.
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
prior to and during WWI. For example, Serbia had been its own independent nation as had
Montenegro. And Macedonia had been a part of the Ottoman Empire. These were diverse
groups which suddenly were part of a single nation. It is no surprise then that they would later
face difficulties in trying to coexist peacefully. Different people groups accustomed to their own
belief systems and histories must share a strong bond after a major conflict in order for any unity
to be upheld. Despite this, Yugoslavia managed to remain relatively united prior to World War
13
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II. But this tenuous experiment in forced unity broke down quickly following the rapid defeat of
its military and collapse of its government following the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s entry into the
war.
During World War II, three major sides emerged of Yugoslav origins. The first were
those of a Croatian puppet dictatorship set up by the Nazis under the care of Ante Pavelic and his
Ustashe fighters. These were Croatian nationalists who clung to terror tactics in order to
subjugate those who would not bow their knee to them. They represented a minority of the
population, but the terror they imposed on the population of non-Croatian ethnic groups set a
precedent for hatred and vengeance which would reemerge fifty years later as Yugoslavia again
splintered. The second group was ethnically based and considered a loyalist group because they
sought to reinstate the exiled monarchy after the war ended. They were known as Chetniks and
were made up of Serbian patriots led by Draza Mihailovic. The third group, which eventually
won the contest for supremacy, was that of the Communist Partisans, or the KPJ. They were led
by Josip Broz Tito and fought simply for future control over Yugoslavia which they eventually
won. These groups all committed atrocities on their fellow countrymen in seeking to come out
victorious at the end of the war leading to a cycle of violence being created that would be
revisited at the end of the century.
The civil war which devoured the Kingdom of Yugoslavia following the flight of its
leaders left many victims, but few victors, as each of the three groups involved pursued its own
violent agenda against any and all opposition. This created a situation in which the strongest
would come out on top. Each side bore responsibility for not breaking this cycle, but the greater
tragedy was that the violence was never dealt with, or resolved, after the war. Instead it was
merely replaced for a while by the strong hand of Tito who kept antagonism between the
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different ethnic groups temporarily at bay only for it to return with a vengeance later on between
new generations of Yugoslavs that had experienced only peace.
To reiterate, “the conquerors (Axis) had both destroyed Yugoslavia as a state and set its
components against each other…” using repressive tactics which “created an environment
favorable to the propagation of revolutionary war.”15 In the vacuum of leadership, the Ustasha
began a campaign of massacres against the Serbs and other non-Croat groups. The Serbs under
Mihailovic and the multi-ethnic Partisans under Tito then rose in self-defense against the Ustasha
and committed retaliatory massacres of their own against the Ustasha, each other, and the Axis
troops stationed in the country. This was the legacy of World War II in Yugoslavia, and despite
Tito’s ability to keep the peace during his reign as dictator he failed miserably in creating an
environment in which the formerly competing groups could completely move on from the
grievances of the past.
Once the civil war was over, Tito brought all the republics of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
under his rule. Yugoslavia then became a communist federation with its power solely invested in
him. His rule was very much like Stalin’s in this way, and the initial position of Tito following
World War II placed him firmly on the side of the Soviet Union, but Stalin offended him in 1948
by seeking to influence Tito’s Yugoslavia by trying to include it in the Cominform. The
Cominform took the place of the former Comintern with its focus on ideological solidarity
among the Soviet Union and other communist nations with the Soviets taking a leading role.
Tito, however, was unwilling to “sacrifice sovereignty for the sake of ideological solidarity.”16
After all, “he (Tito) and his partisans, not the Red Army, had driven the Nazis out; unlike any of
the other East European counterparts, Tito did not depend upon Stalin’s support to remain in
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power.” Instead, “efforts to subject him to Cominform orthodoxy caused Tito to bristle, and by
the end of June, 1948, he had openly broken with Moscow.”17 Soon after breaking with Stalin,
relations were opened up between Tito and the West, especially the United States.
A Yugoslavia which remained communist but set itself apart from Stalin was of great
value to the United States. It revealed that the “iron curtain” had potential weaknesses which
could be exploited. Thus, the U.S. pursued an agenda which would bring Yugoslavia into its
influence, predominantly through economic resistance. Tito never aligned himself with the U.S.,
but the U.S. continued to pursue more influence with Yugoslavia while contenting itself with
Tito acting as a barrier to Soviet hegemony. However, the end of the Cold War changed all that,
and the U.S. quickly lost interest in Yugoslavia with the fall of its once mighty adversary.
Within Yugoslavia, the peace that Tito was able to sustain after the unrest brought on by
World War II was nothing short of amazing. The most striking peace was that which he
achieved between Croatians and Serbs. “Some Croats, at least, could take satisfaction in the fact
that Marshal Tito was a Croat by birth and upbringing. Some Serbs could find satisfaction in the
fact that fellow Serbs held a disproportionately large number of positions in the army, secret
police, and federal bureaucracy.”18 The success he achieved was not universal, however. Many
of the policies Tito used had negative impacts later on after his death. The greatest failure was
that he did not allow others a voice in his regime. This made the rise of nationalism at the end of
the century all the more reactive. The fact that two of the presidents of the emerging republics
had been political prisoners under Tito speaks to this fact.19
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The Decline of Yugoslavia
What occurred in Yugoslavia during World War II was a historical representation of what
could happen again if events were allowed to continue along the course they took at the end of
the century. The international community should have learned from the WWII example and
listened to organizations like Helsinki Watch, but this was regrettably not to be. War did not
spontaneously break out again in Yugoslavia, however. There were early indicators of what was
to come with a gradual buildup of tension before an actual outburst of violence. This buildup
gave the international community time to react, but time and again they either failed to act or
capitulated to the stronger party’s demands allowing actions to take place that further strained
relations between the different groups at the table. All the while the outlook for those at risk in
Yugoslavia’s affected republics worsened.
With Tito’s death in 1980 Yugoslavia lost the one person capable of holding the nation
together politically. The tenuous ground on which the Communist federation had been built
began to crumble, and then collapsed, with the end of the Cold War, and just ten years later a war
broke out which in many ways resembled that which was brought to an end with Tito’s victory
following World War II. A country which seemed so promising just a few years earlier had
slipped into civil war, but in many ways the civil war was inevitable as a result of the many
deep-lying issues at its core. All that was needed to set off the war was a collapse in the federal
government, the glue upon which solidarity within Yugoslavia was built, and that is just what
happened. According to Zimmerman, Tito “unwittingly stimulated nationalism by destroying the
central government’s viability, empowering the republics, and creating the ludicrously feeble
collective presidency.”20 Yugoslavia only existed, because Tito held it together by putting the
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needs of Yugoslavia as a whole ahead of the desires of its individual parts. When Tito died, that
all changed. A strong federal leader was replaced by leaders that either lacked the strength and
Yugoslav nationalism of Tito, or were for their republics or provinces first and the nation of
Yugoslavia second. Without a strong leader to subdue the republics, the nation of Yugoslavia
began to unravel.
Republican issues became outcries of nationalism throughout the 1980s. Nationalism
alone was not a bad thing. It was only when nationalism became interconnected with a desire for
ethnic homogeneity by those in power that nationalism went from being a source of pride to a
weapon for those who held on to grievances tracing back to World War II and beyond. With
language and hostilities escalating, the leaders and their zealot followers loosed their hatred on
their neighbors and encouraged others in their same ethnic group to follow suit.
At the beginning of 1990, there was speculation and fear that Yugoslavia was already on
the verge of collapse, but the nature of that collapse was not yet known. In 1989, Romania
experienced a successful, bloody revolution against the head of its Communist government who
was promptly executed along with his wife. This led leaders to fear what might be in their own
future as “Yugoslav Communists and their opponents” began to “agree that in this nation with a
long history of civil strife, a fear of a violent anti-communist backlash” had potential to become
a reality.21 But the bigger question was “whether the old, passionate rivalry among Yugoslavia’s
ethnic groups [might] tear apart the Communist Party or even the nation.”22 This was exactly
what happened in 1990. Tom Gallagher, an historian and writer of The Balkans after the Cold
War, determined that holding “a genuinely competitive all-Yugoslav election” would have
allowed for “forces committed to a democratic Yugoslavia based on ethnic parity” to compete
21
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for power. Yet, when elections took place in each of the six republics, the end result of those
elections gave “initiative to parties who wanted either to take their republic out of Yugoslavia, or
recentralize it around their own ethnic group.”23 This led to even greater divisions as ethnicity
became a point of contention.
Eventually Yugoslavia as it had existed under Tito ceased to exist. Placing the blame on
one specific republic or individual is impossible to do when looking at the collapse of
Yugoslavia, however, and nothing is gained by pointing fingers. But the breakup did happen as
had been speculated. One of the first steps toward collapse started with the Communist party’s
splintering. This began with the Slovenian walkout of the party conference on Jan 23, 1990.
After this, the “delegates left to return to their republics, where local Communist parties began
emergency meetings to see whether they should pull out of the national organization or pull back
together.”24 These meetings led to the eventual split over how the different republics viewed the
future of Yugoslavia.
The Slovenian walkout was based on their frustrations over “deeply unequal levels of
development.”25 The leaders of Slovenia felt that their republic was holding up the poorer
republics of Yugoslavia, and they were not wrong in this belief. Their solution was to give more
sovereignty to the individual republics thereby decreasing the power of the federal government
but retaining unity. The Serbian leadership took the polar opposite position to this with the
president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, calling for the strengthening of the federal government
in order to keep Yugoslavia strong. Montenegro followed the Serbian lead in advocating this
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plan. With these two sides in opposition to one another and unwilling to compromise, the other
republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were forced to pick a side in the widening rift.
The question as to who should take the blame for starting the war is a complicated one to
answer. As Yugoslavia began falling apart, each side pointed to the other in claiming that it was
them who had started it and not us. Our actions were merely a response to those of the other.
Serbia said that it was Croatia and Slovenia acting selfishly in their move to secede which set the
collapse in motion. They also pointed at the international community for meddling in
Yugoslavia’s affairs in recognizing the secessionist republics. Croatia and Slovenia in turn
blamed the Serbs for being uncompromising in their desire to invest more power in the federal
government at the cost of any independent movement. What is lost in the finger-pointing is that
they all had a hand in bringing Yugoslavia to ruin. The situation only spun out of control after
each side refused to step down and began to doggedly pursue their own agendas in response to
the actions of their opponents rather than seeking a peaceful alternative. Fear led to greater fear
and violence led only to additional, increasingly extreme violence while emotions prevailed over
reason.
The leaders of the republics only made matters worse through their actions and words.
Slobodan Milosevic was one of the most important names to remember in understanding what
became of Yugoslavia. Milosevic took control over the presidency of Serbia in 1988. Following
this, he led the charge for giving more power to the federal government at the cost of weakening
the republics, essentially counteracting what Tito had set into motion prior to his death.
Individuals that worked with Milosevic experienced different personalities. Warren
Zimmerman, saw two sides of Milosevic. One “was hard-line, authoritarian, belligerent, bent on
chaos, and wedded to the use of force to create a Greater Serbia.” A second “was polite, affable,
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cooperative, and always looking for reasonable solutions to Yugoslavia’s problems.”26 These
two sides of Milosevic were just covers for what David Halberstam saw as the true Milosevic—
the supernationalist. When Slovenia and Croatia seceded, the supernationalist Milosevic
emerged, and his focus changed to creating a Greater Serbia which would include all Serbs of
former Yugoslavia.27
The problem with this was that absorbing all the Serbian population was not a realistic
goal. Most communities in Yugoslavia had become ethnically mixed over time, thus any attempt
to create a homogenous Serbian state would force those of other ethnicities into the severe
minority or cause mass migration over fear of living under a hostile Serbian government.
Serbian authorities had done nothing to assuage such fears by their actions up to this point.
Kosovo had fallen under a sort of “apartheid” during the 1980s with thousands of Albanians
losing their jobs only to have Serbs “dispatched to fill key positions.”28 This was the example of
minority rights that the other nations had in front of them, and clearly this was not a good option.
A member of the executive council of the ruling Muslim party in Bosnia stated it well when he
said, “the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina will never accept the freedoms given to the
Albanians of Kosovo.”29
The position of the Serbian leadership also came to a take an increasingly hard-line as the
situation escalated. Milosevic and the other Serb leaders calling for complete Serbian autonomy
made it clear that “the destiny of all Serbs was to live in one state, and since all land on which
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Serbs lived was by definition Serb land, it rightfully belonged to ‘Greater Serbia.’”30 In January
of 1991, this action was officially threatened by Milosevic when he said he would “demand
territory from neighboring republics” if a confederation was created.31 What this demand failed
to represent was the other ethnicities represented in the areas he was demanding. This was a
statement which the international community should have jumped on in condemning Milosevic
and threatening action. Instead, his threat was later allowed to be carried out upon the populace
of the republics of Croatia and, most disastrously, Bosnia. This ideology was also allowed to
permeate the communities of Serbs in the other republics who could now look to Serbia as their
protector if they felt in any way threatened.
No one made this position more frighteningly clear than Radovan Karadzic, the leader of
the Bosnian Serbs, when speaking about Sarajevo. He proclaimed that, “Sarajevo was Serb
because Serbs had been there first, implying that Bosniacs (Muslim Bosnians) were some kind of
alien force that had moved into Sarajevo from somewhere else; anything not purely Serb
Orthodox was a form of occupation and had to be eliminated.”32 This was clearly a radical
position held only by the more extreme Serbs, yet throughout the eventual war, this was the
position which was voiced loudest. The international community should have picked up on this
red flag. Despite the ubiquity of demonizing opponents through propaganda in war today, talk of
the elimination of other ethnic groups should always trigger a strong response from international
peacekeeping organizations like the UN. The statements made by those making policy were not
hard to understand in what they implicated. In the statement above by Karadzic, there could be
no mistaking his intent for Sarajevo. Yet the voices of these individuals were ignored by the
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leaders in the U.S. and Europe despite the frightening language being used. The threats of these
leaders should have been taken seriously as their twisted nationalism would be a leading factor in
the breakup of Yugoslavia.
Milosevic was not the sole Yugoslavian leader bent on a land grab if Yugoslavia
collapsed. Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia also wanted to carve out his own piece of
Yugoslavia if it fell apart. Much like Milosevic, he desired a Greater Croatia which would
encompass all Croatians into one nation; however, Tudjman lacked the military means to deliver
on this intent.33 Throughout the fall of Yugoslavia and War in Bosnia, he would prove himself
to be just as stubborn as Milosevic, and he might have been convicted of war crimes as well had
he not died in 1999.
Bosnia had the misfortune of being positioned directly between these two leaders and
their nations, and its “central location and mixed ethnic and religious profile ma[de] it a natural
battleground between the forces on opposite sides of the confederation-federation conflict.”34
Thus, as the peace talks floundered, any and all hope for a peaceful resolution was lost. With no
desire to negotiate, Milosevic and Tudjman’s selfish ambitions led the way towards the
destruction of not only Bosnia’s territory and people, but their own country’s international
reputations and structural integrity.
The propaganda of the republics, especially Serbia, was essential to the build-up of
tensions in Yugoslavia. Propaganda was used to instill fear in populations by pointing to past
atrocities the other ethnic groups had committed in order to encourage their own population to
act out first for protection of their own interests. Serbia mastered this tactic early on. One of
Milosevic’s first targets was Politika, a large circulation Serbian newspaper. The other republics
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followed soon after leading to a cycle of fear promoting violence as a twisted form of protection.
Thus, those in power took the lessons of history and coupled them with information technology
in order to create a frenzy out of which war would come.35
The media is a strong catalyst in its ability to prompt action by those who fall under its
auspices. This was especially true when looking at the role of state-sponsored propaganda in
inciting action. The Serbian government proved highly effective in its use of history as a
propaganda tool for demonizing the other ethnic groups. For Croatians, all they had to do was
point back to World War II and the role of the Ustasha. Journalist Chuck Sudetic pointed out
some of the historical wrongs that were being used.
Serbs have a tradition of armed resistance and a memory of atrocities committed by
Croatia’s wartime Fascist regime. That memory has spawned a deep fear of Croatian
nationalism. Crude, sensationalist disinformation spread by Serbian demagogues and
Belgrade’s government-backed media has whipped up the Serbs’ fears to a dangerous
frenzy.36
In order to demonize the Muslims of former Yugoslavia, the Serbian leadership had to look
much further back in history. Then, “by conflating the demons of yesteryear with the stereotypes
of today, neighbors were converted into the conquering Turks of the Middle Ages who had
occupied ‘Serb’ lands and oppressed the Serb nation.”37 This allowed for Milosevic, Karadzic
and other Serbian leaders like them to demonize the Muslim populations outside of their borders
in areas like Bosnia and Kosovo. Because the ethnic Serbs in these areas represented minorities
of the population, the potential threat to them by the Muslims was far more evident.
The great crimes Milosevic and his underlings were able to perpetuate on their victims
bore testimony to their achievements in slander and fear mongering. According to Stephen
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Engelberg of The New York Times, Milosevic’s pursuit of a Greater Serbia employed a single
strategy. “Each step begins with a propaganda campaign stressing injustices—usually grossly
exaggerated—done to Serbs…Having stoked the fires with propaganda, Milosevic then pressures
his target, either through organized demonstrations, military action or diplomacy.”38 As tension
escalated to war, “military action” became the means by which Milosevic could achieve his goal
of Serbian autonomy through the destruction of the non-Serb populations. Without minority or
majority groups present to advocate for the land he desired for the Serbs, then he would have a
much easier time keeping it for himself and the nation of Serbia. Thus, “the lists of crimes that
Serb religious nationalists had claimed falsely were being carried out against Serbs became a
blueprint for Serb nationalist programs of ethnic cleansing.”39
The Serbian leadership and individuals on the ground following the genocidal policies
were not alone in their transgressions, however. The other republics counterattacked, often with
the same policies in place. Nasir Oric, a Bosnian Muslim, took charge of the irregular Muslim
forces in and around Srebrenica and attacked Serb-controlled villages massacring many in those
villages.40 Reprisals like these and the acts that inspired them promoted the idea that
heterogeneity in ethnic demographics might not be possible despite a more recent history of
peaceful coexistence in Bosnia and the whole of Yugoslavia prior to the war. So instead of
focusing on recent history as the best solution, leaders succeeded in pursuing their purpose of
homogeneous states through the use of mass genocide and expulsions. John F. Burns of The
New York Times summarized this well.
Like the killings of civilians, the expulsions reflect in microcosm what has happened
across wide areas of Croatia in the last year, and more recently in Bosnia and
Herzegovina… In these places, groups of heavily armed men—most often Serbs, but also
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Croats in areas of Croatia where there are ethnic Serbian minorities, and Croats and
Muslim Slavs in some Serbian minority areas of Bosnia—seek to unscramble the ethnic
map. It is demographic engineering on a huge scale, generating new hatreds that seem
likely to plague this part of the Balkans for generations.41
Hatred overshadowed the peace which had transpired in the decades since World War II. That
hatred was again stoked by this war, but this new generation had the opportunity to learn from
the mistakes made by their elders. In a quote taken from the New Yorker, Lawrence Lifschultz,
a former South Asia correspondent, and his wife Rabia Ali, a Pakistani-born writer and research
analyst at the World Bank's Research Department, suggested that what South Africa and the
former Yugoslavia had in common was “simply their pain and their manipulation by politicians
who exploit[ed] the idea that only ethnically homogeneous societies [could] be successful.”42
This belief was at the core of Milosevic and Tudjman’s leadership and strategies, the very
foundations of which the European Community and especially the United States should have
been quick to understand and reveal to be false. Unfortunately, the U.S. and their European
allies failed to react to these early signs of disintegration, and the reactive nationalism of the
Yugoslavian republics soon led it to collapse.
The Collapse of Yugoslavia
In a last ditch effort, the republics of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s leaders
offered one final compromise in an effort to stave off disaster. Reported on June 7, 1991 in The
New York Times, their proposal recommended that the republics of Yugoslavia would gain their
sovereignty as nations, but they would seek no international recognition or membership in the
United Nations.43 This was an attempt at appeasing the two opposing sides by giving autonomy
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to the different republics while keeping Yugoslavia intact as the one recognized entity of the
international community. The leaders of Macedonia and Bosnia refused to give up on
compromise because they knew each of their republics would be at a significant disadvantage
should negotiations lead to war. Bosnians were especially worried about what would happen
with both Croatia and Serbia claiming land within Bosnia’s borders. The situation finally
reached its breaking point on June 25, 1991 with the secession of Croatia and then Slovenia.
According to Glenny, the secessions were the events which finally “woke the demons of civil
war from their 46-year-old hibernation,” and a war which had been silenced with Tito’s
consolidation of power was once again ignited between the republics.44
Without a strong backing by the international community to deter an eventual military
confrontation, and with every attempt at compromise through negotiations having failed,
Yugoslavia finally succumbed to the opposing leaders’ resolve to settle the dispute through
strength of arms. The first place to experience this confrontation was Slovenia. Fighting began
“after Serbia, the largest of the nation’s republics and the dominant force in the Yugoslav
military, made clear that it would use force to hold the federation together and prevent Slovenia
from setting up border checkpoints and taking other steps toward autonomy.45 Fortunately for
the Slovenians, this attempt was quickly fended off and they retained their independence. The
other secessionist republics of Croatia and Bosnia were not so fortunate, however, as Milosevic
and the Yugoslav army now set their gaze on them. Questions quickly arose regarding whether
the Yugoslav army was really still under the control of the Yugoslav leadership after this attempt
at keeping Slovenia in through force was taken without the authority of the Yugoslav Prime
Minister, Ante Markovic. The military, especially its officers, had continued to remain
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predominantly Serb since World War II. This trend continued into the 1990s for Yugoslavia, so
it came as little surprise that the military was vulnerable to honoring the Serbian leadership and
authority when Yugoslavia collapsed. There were many desertions following their actions as
soldiers from the other republics defected to defend their new nations, families, and homes, but a
majority of the military remained in service under Milosevic and the Serbian military complex.
Croatia was the next nation to be attacked by what remained of the Yugoslav army. At
this point, casualties began to grow and the international community under the auspices of the
United Nations finally began to notice and resond. After only six months of fighting, devastation
was already apparent: thousands of soldiers and civilians were dead, Eastern Europe’s most
promising economy was fragmented and destroyed, half a million refugees had been created and
hatred had been incited for future generations of conflict. Yet despite all of this wreckage, “it
had not yet produced a decisive military result.”46 Without such a result, war spread into Bosnia
where there was a large population of ethnic Serbs.
While negotiations were taking place, and even after war was raging in Croatia, the
Bosnian President, Izetbegovic, continuously tried to ensure that peace would reign in Bosnia.
Ultimately, he had four real options he could pursue. His first option would be to follow Croatia
and Slovenia’s compromise plan which would promote more sovereignty for the republics, but
this would place him in direct opposition to Serbia. Secondly, Izetbegovic could side with the
Serbians in promoting a stronger federal government for Yugoslavia, but after the secession of
the other republics, this was not a desirable position. For the Muslims especially, this
represented “the scenario they fear[ed] most: the creation of a greater Serbia,” and they were
right to fear this due to what “a whittled-down Yugoslavia” would logistically mean for them.
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“Minus Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia, Yugoslavia would have a population of roughly 14
million people of whom two-thirds would be Serbs.”47 Within the second option, the fear of the
Muslims being treated like the Muslim Albanians in Kosovo became a foreseeable reality, so this
too was a bad choice.
Izetbegovic’s third option was to claim independence and secede from Yugoslavia with
the intention of seeking international recognition. This was ultimately the choice that was made,
but the costs for this were extremely high. The fourth and final choice was essentially to do
nothing and see how things worked out. Unfortunately, this had the potential of placing Bosnia
in a situation which might lead to its use as a pawn in “a peace patched together with parts of this
republic, redistributed as booty in the feud between Serbia and Croatia.”48 Clearly, none of these
choices really had any potential for a beneficial outcome. Thus, Izetbegovic was left to make the
best decision he could for his republic.
What followed, according to Izetbegovic, was a policy of “appeasement” to the Serbians
by the international powers.49 “Appeasement” is historically a loaded word, but it was precisely
what the international community began to do in the face of Serbia’s aggression. Thus, with no
desire to become a part of a ‘Greater Serbia,” Bosnia seceded, declaring its independence on
October 15, 1991. Ali and Lifschultz said that this action was naïve, for “the Bosnian parliament
had declared independence without adequate preparations to either secure or defend it” and,
“instead, succumbed to a certain political naiveté and placed its faith in European and U.S.
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commitments.”50 Regardless, it is still the position of this paper that this was the best decision
for Bosnia, given the myriad of poorer choices.
Under the circumstances, there was little else that Bosnia could do but place its hope in
the international community. Izetbegovic knew that his republic did not have the means to stand
up against the Yugoslav army and militant Bosnian Serbs in the eastern portions of Bosnia. For
this reason, he quickly followed up his declaration with an appeal to the UN Security Council “to
deploy peacekeeping forces in this Yugoslav republic as soon as possible to reduce the risk of a
serious outbreak of ethnic violence.”51 What was happening in Croatia would soon spill over
into Bosnia, and he was giving the international community advance warning that they could do
something to stop the violence before it came. Three months later, the Bosnian delegation was
appealing again. This time, however, the delegation was appealing “as fighting raged for a third
day in the town of Bosanski Brod.”52 The opportunity for a cease fire had been missed, and
things only got worse from here.
As war spread through Bosnia, the fury of the fighting and atrocities, both experienced
and committed by the different groups, quickly escalated. In all fairness, individuals from every
side contributed to the cycle of violence. The Serbs would commit the largest number of
atrocities over the duration of the war, but the Croats would commit many of their own as well in
their attempts to claim the second spot of power and logistical control. Both were equally guilty
of human rights violations as were many Bosnian Muslims. However, the conflict between the
Serbs and Croats was quickly recognized as the trigger of what would become an even larger
war. The U.S. Helsinki Commission, otherwise known as the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, already recognized the possibility of an escalation in violence in
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February 1992. U.S. Representative Jim Moody53 of Wisconsin presented what he had observed
in meetings with the leaders of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia to the Commission and made it clear
that the war already being fought in Croatia was “a continuation of an old conflict between Serbs
and Croats,” and that it was “particularly important to prevent any fighting from spreading to
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a spark could ignite a bloody war of endless reprisals, involving not
only Serbs and Croatians, but also [Muslims].”54 Moody’s arguments demonstrated an
understanding and communication of what was to come. Thus, the U.S. and the international
community again missed an opportunity to act forcefully at a point in which casualties still
remained somewhat low, and they would continue to miss opportunities for the next few years.
The Role of the United Nations
The UN committed many errors in Bosnia, but it would be wrong to concentrate only on
the errors. The organization must be credited with trying to help and mediate matters in the
Balkans. The intentions of the UN were always good; the problems arose from its members.
China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France and the United States are all
permanent members with veto power, and Yugoslavia was historically connected to each of these
powerful nations. Complicating things further, France, Russia and the UK were all allies of
Serbia in each of the World Wars.55 This caused the leaders of these nations to act reluctantly
against Serbia despite its role as the aggressor. Eventually leadership would change and these
nations would turn against Serbia, but by that point hundreds of thousands had already died in
former Yugoslavia. Thus, their actions must be observed and critiqued in order to more clearly
understand what went wrong.
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The United Nations’ role in Bosnia began well, but it did little to impede the carnage that
transpired between April 1992 and December 1995. Though the Bosnian War began as a civil
war, it quickly escalated into a significant international concern with the introduction of UN
Security Council resolutions and personnel. The introduction of these economic and human
elements intertwined the UN’s future with that of Bosnia, creating a more direct relationship
between the actions of the UN and what was actually taking place in the country.
The UNs’ main objectives in Bosnia were to contain the conflict and stop the atrocities
from continuing by brokering a peace settlement between the three groups. With the passing of
UN security resolution 713 on the 25 September 1991, the first step by the UN towards stopping
the violence was imposed with the creation of an arms embargo on the whole of the former
Yugoslavia.56 Coupled with this policy was the requirement to bring the heads of the fighting
factions to the negotiation table. Movement in this direction began by inserting UN military
liaisons into the country (Resolutions 727 and 740, 8 January and 7 February 1992) and
eventually peacekeepers and dispersers of humanitarian aid in the form of UNPROFOR, or UN
Protection Force (Resolution 743, 21 February 1992). The next step was to create a no-fly zone
over Bosnia (Resolution 781, 9 October 1992) followed by the creation of UN “safe zones” for
those fleeing (Resolutions 819 and 824, 16 April and 6 May 1993)57. This was followed by the
establishment of an International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia to prosecute those violating
humanitarian law (Resolution 827, 25 May 1993), yet each step would demonstrate itself to be
insufficient, as the fighting continued for 2 more years after even these later resolutions. Thus,
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after all these things had failed, the UN created a rapid reaction force (Resolution 998, 16 June
1995) and started strategic bombing as punishment for breaking the terms of agreements.58
It is important to note how early the UN Security Council actually understood what was
happening in Bosnia. Resolution 787 first referenced “ethnic cleansing” taking place on 16
November 1992. Resolution 798 condemned the Serbs for the “systematic detention and rape of
women” in Bosnia on 18 December 1992. Also notable was UN soldiers were never given the
right to fire if fired upon or the ability to use force to protect civilians which added to a sense of
hopelessness for those on the ground in the country. Over the years of the war, there were
obviously many other actions and resolutions passed. However, these were some of the most
significant which bear mentioning because of their specific implications amidst the conflict. All
of these resolutions were necessary and good, but the timing in which they were implemented
and the lack of action to back up their words was unacceptable.
The negotiators made a mess of things from the start. As arbitrators of the conflict, the
Western diplomats were responsible for bringing about a swift and satisfactory end to the
conflict. Instead negotiations turned into a ”tragic game of procrastination.”59 Decision-making
in conflicts such as the civil war in Yugoslavia require well thought out decisions to be made
quickly. Every day in which no action was taken meant more civilians and soldiers would die.
This only got worse as the war spread to Bosnia. “While Bosnia’s towns and villages were set
ablaze, governments in Paris, London, New York, and Washington, unencumbered by any great
sense of urgency, engaged in protracted, contentious and, in the end, sterile debate over the
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options available to them to stop the war.”60 The stakes were high, and there should have been
no doubt that something must be done when human rights violations became common
knowledge. The UN was formed in part to try and ensure that future generations would not
suffer the same horrors of the earlier half of the twentieth century. But poor decisions, inaction,
and timidity on the part of the UN marred the peace process throughout the early nineties.
One of the first major mistakes to be made was recognizing the republics and accepting
them into the UN as newly independent states but then doing nothing to protect them. As they
recognized the republics, they should also have “de-recognized” Yugoslavia.61 It no longer
made sense to sustain actions against all of former Yugoslavia when half of its republics were
recognized as independent and others were waiting for recognition.
The first example of this complexity was the arms embargo. With the passing of
Resolution 713 of the United Nations Security Council, an arms embargo against all of
Yugoslavia was declared.62 The embargo made sense while the nation continued to exist and be
recognized as Yugoslavia, but as soon as the international community, especially those nations
of the European Community and United States, began recognizing the individual republics as
independent, it no longer made sense to clump them all together.
From an outsider’s perspective, an arms embargo would seem like a wise approach to
stemming the violence taking place within a conflict. It would at least make it difficult for the
sides involved to commit themselves to protracted campaigns of violence if they could not find
an outside means to keep themselves armed. However, the arms embargo had an adverse effect
in Bosnia for the Bosnian Muslims, who suddenly lost their ability to arm and defend

60

Ali, 379.
“De-Recognize Yugoslavia,” The New York Times, 18 December 1991, A28.
62
NATO Website, http://www.nato.int/IFOR/un/u910925a.htm (Accessed January 12, 2011).

61

35

themselves. President Clinton understood this early on in his administration and the complexity
of the situation which existed:
There plainly is a civil war in Bosnia that is, among other things, a fight primarily
between the Serbs and the Muslims but also involving the Croatians. It is complicated by
the fact that Serbia, a separate country, has intervened in it, and complicated by the fact
that the United Nations before Bosnia, the nation of Bosnia was even recognized,
imposed an arms embargo in the area. But the practical impact of the arms embargo that
the United Nations imposed was to give the entire weaponry of the Yugoslav Army to the
Serbian Bosnians and deprive any kind of equal weaponry to the people fighting against
them. So the global community had, not on purpose, but inadvertently, has had a huge
impact on the outcome of that war in ways that have been very bad.63
Another grave error was the length of time it took for the United Nations to send in a
peacekeeping force, even after all the powers in conflict with each other had requested such a
force. The Yugoslav national government and the leaders of Slovenia and Croatia all asked for
the United Nations to send a major peacekeeping operation in late 1991. Bosnia asked for aid
shortly after this as well. However, in reply to these requests, UN officials determined that only
a “token force” would be proposed as a “signal to the combatants that they must prove they
really want peace.” 64 Their response was both counterintuitive and nonsensical as its unlikely
that these government bodies would have asked for a peacekeeping mission if they did not
indeed desire peace. This was a golden opportunity for the United Nations to be able to place
troops in the countries affected and work for a real peace. The Security Council was in
agreement with the Secretary General on this in initially proposing that small numbers of
“military liaison officers” be sent in order to monitor the situation.65 This had a detrimental
effect on the support of their allies.
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The UN had hoped that enough peacekeepers would be deployed to deter Serb attacks,
but President Clinton had made it clear that the United States would not send troops, and
the European countries that had already deployed soldiers to Bosnia were reluctant to
contribute many more peacekeepers to a failing UN effort.”66
The inability of the Bosnian civilians to arm themselves and the initial lack of
humanitarian troops to, at the very least, dampen Serbian aggression was only made worse by the
fact that the Serbs were waging indiscriminate warfare on the civilian population of Bosnia, both
Croatian Bosnians and Muslim Bosnians (even Bosnian Serbs that refused to leave their homes,
friends, or family in areas like Sarajevo). The Serbian artillery units above Sarajevo were able to
shell the city with immunity because the city’s defenders lacked the weapons, and therefore the
ability, to strike back.67 Once the Serbian military accomplished taking part of the city of
Sarajevo they were able to use snipers as well. These strategies were as successful in terrorizing
the populace of Sarajevo as they were elsewhere.
The United Nations made another critical error involving troops when it refused to allow
for its troops to act either in self-defense or in defense of the civilian population when terms of
the negotiations were broken or when noncombatant’s lives were endangered. This was further
exacerbated by the fact that the negotiating parties were to adhere to an honor system with no
threat of force or negative consequences in place should they break the terms of that system.
Resolution 727 of the United Nations Security Council made this abundantly clear when it
“urge[d] all parties to honour the commitments made at Geneva and Sarajevo with a view to
effecting a complete cessation of hostilities” and “request[ed] all parties to take all necessary
measures to ensure the safety of the personnel sent by the United Nations and of the members of
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the European Community Monitoring Mission.”68 This resolution and the majority of
resolutions following this one up until after the Srebrenica massacre were devoid of strong
language or the presence of negative repercussions should terms be broken—a particularly
striking contrast to the virulent language being used in propaganda by the Serbian leadership.
While negotiations were being held, propaganda in Serbia and elsewhere was making use
of strong language and lies in order to incite action against those different from themselves. In
the face of such bold rhetoric, the UN’s use of language was noticeably weak. There were no
commands; there were only ‘urges’ and ‘requests’ which proved easy to ignore. A lack of strong
language or any threat of immediate repercussions only strengthened the resolve of Serbian
leaders like General Mladic who then took it upon themselves to act with even greater aggression
against the civilian population of Bosnia. Throughout this entire process, the UN continued to
dream of brokering a peace agreement, and the Bosnian Muslims and their fellow citizens that
held to the belief that a multicultural, pluralistic society could and should persist continued to
die.
Two years later, in August of 1993, this sentiment remained the same as Clinton stated,
“the message is, first of all, that the allies are determined to protect the United Nations forces
there, determined to secure the humanitarian relief program. And the other message is that we
would very much—all of us--like to see a successful agreement and a fair peace agreement that
can then be enforced.” 69 Enforcement would only come once terms of peace were made
acceptable to all parties. After two years of negotiations and war, there were still no
accommodations for UN troops on the ground to act with force when Serbian forces disrupted
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their ability to disperse aid. The distribution of humanitarian aid in crisis situations today is one
of the great humanitarian victories of the current era, but the terms by which the troops were able
to distribute it while simultaneously allowing acts of genocide to continue unchecked did not line
up with the purposes of the UN and one reason for which it was created.
David Rieff questioned the reasoning of this dichotomy. He felt that “any future moral
authority in the United Nations could hope to exercise depended on its doing something to help
in Bosnia.” After all, it seemed “incongruous that UN soldiers and UNHCR convoy drivers
risked and sometimes lost their lives to bring in food to isolated areas, but steadfastly refused to
silence the guns that were causing the emergency.”70 The politics of creating a peace agreement
appeared to be the very thing which allowed peace to remain unattainable. The environment
became increasingly difficult for the UN soldiers. Even if had been given the right to fight when
necessary they “were almost always outnumbered and underarmed, and they never knew whether
they should return fire. If they did, they might move from being impartial peacekeepers to armed
participants, and not only would the mighty Serbs turn on them, but their superiors at UN
headquarters in New York would be furious.”71 With a UN Security Council directive in place,
nobody on the ground could fire a shot, and there would be negative repercussions for anyone
who did. The Serbian leaders taking part in negotiations realized this and began using it to their
advantage knowing that the UN peacekeepers were not there to stop them as long as such
directives continued. The UN would continue to pursue diplomatic means towards peace with
little measurable change in policy despite this continued aggression by the forces in Bosnia. This
led countries like the United States to saying they could have no part in placing their own troops
on the ground there in assisting with the humanitarian aid process.
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What remained more striking than anything else in this conflict, however, was the
duration of the peace process. The Bosnian War lasted four years with little measurable progress
in the peace negotiations or limiting of violence on the ground for the first couple years. This led
to individuals like Warren Zimmerman, and others to question how functional the United
Nations could actually be in determining and endorsing policy in regional conflicts. Time was
imperative in bringing the violence to an end as long as individuals were losing their lives, but
the process was neither timely nor succinct. Speaking on the nature of diplomacy in this conflict,
Zimmerman reasoned that,
Those who practice diplomacy need constantly to be reminded of the human damage
their efforts, or lack of them, can cause. For three years of the Bosnian war, the Western
countries had attempted to rebuff the Serbian aggressors, bloated by their use of force,
without making them fear that force would in turn be used against them. Western
diplomacy was reduced to a kind of cynical theater, a pretense of useful activity, a way of
disguising a lack of will. Diplomacy without force became an unloaded weapon,
impotent and ridiculous.72
Though he was not alone in this sentiment, it was disturbing to hear a former ambassador speak
of the delineations in such a way.
One of the gravest errors made by the intervening powers was eventually rewarding
Croatia and Serbia with land they had claimed outside their own republic’s borders. This
occurred in early 1993 after the new Clinton Administration supported former Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign Secretary David Owen’s “settlement based on ten
ethnic provinces and accepting for the first time that territory seized by Serbian forces in their
campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ would be recognized as a fait accompli.”73 From any angle, this
was an unfortunate decision, and it soon became clear to those who put the plan together that this
was the case. “The cheery optimism of Vance and Owen quickly proved to be a chimera. As
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predicted, their plan provided a perverse rationale for one of the most violent phases of land
grabbing and ‘ethnic cleansing’ yet seen in the Balkan war ‘by tempting the owners of the
national provinces to full possession of their mini-states.’”74 Rewarding aggression logically led
to more aggression. Such decisions encouraged the Serbian leadership by revealing that when it
pushed, there would be no push back from the international community. Thus, there was no
incentive for Milosevic to back off. This also encouraged Tudjman to pursue his own cut of
Bosnia for Croatia. In all these decisions, Bosnia was the loser. In defense of Vance and Owen,
they were making their decision based on the actions, or more accurately, inactions, of the
nations they were representing. “Yes, it was an imperfect plan, but it was the only one possible
without military intervention.”75 Thus, the negotiators’ jobs were made difficult not only by the
parties at war but by those they were representing in trying to bring about a peace agreement.
President Clinton was willing to acknowledge that the process was not without fault.
When asked by a reporter in May 1994 whether the chain of command in and between the UN
and NATO was too cumbersome or bureaucratic, President Clinton admitted that it was a
problem the UN was working on. However, Clinton also asserted a valid argument for looking
at the proceedings with grace in light of the international organizations “trying to do something
that has not before been done: put NATO in the service of preserving the peace in Europe
outside the NATO membership area for the first time ever and to work with the United Nations
when the United Nations forces are on the ground, but not combatants themselves.”76 The reality
that the UN was on the ground while NATO controlled the skies made things difficult. Initially
this made sense while peace was trying to be achieved without the shedding of blood. Yet the
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time it took for the UN to move from negotiating peace to penalizing acts of aggression was a
long road, leaving the Bosnians to bear the heartbreak in the interim. However exhausting the
process was for those taking part in negotiations, it is important to remember that these
negotiations were exponentially more difficult on the victims in Bosnia as events continued
without significant change.
Few understood this better than a little girl who lived through much of the siege of
Sarajevo. Credited as the Anne Frank of the Bosnian War, Zlata Filipovic expressed her
frustration with the way politics were being handled. In November 1992, she recorded in her
diary that there was “nothing new on the political front” as the negotiations and resolutions were
passed yet appeared to do little to impact the lives of those within Sarajevo. Instead they were
“dying, freezing, starving, crying, parting with [their] friends, leaving [their] loved ones” while
the ‘kids’ played politics. 77 Tragically, these negotiations continued for two more years at the
cost of thousands more lives lost.
The true nature of the UN was revealed in its role in former Yugoslavia. It revealed itself
to be made up of peacekeepers, not peacemakers, even when basic human rights were being
violated and established reports of genocide and mass rape were being delivered to them and
reported in the news. The UN would later show another major flaw of their policy when they
held the lives of their own troops above the lives of those individuals they were being sent in to
protect as virtually every UN Security Council resolution called upon all the parties to “ensure
the safety of United Nations and other personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian
assistance.”78 A significant test of this resolve came at Srebrenica in 1995.
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Srebrenica is important to mention because it represents the location of one of the
greatest massacres of Bosnian Muslims in the war. It is also important because “the fall of
Srebrenica changed everything. It offended the Western nations and in some way made the
tragedy personal.”79 The greatest hardship of this massacre was that it occurred in an area that
had been declared a UN safe zone. This led to “debate over complicity in genocide on the part of
UN personnel.”80
What is undeniable is that when Srebrenica was bombarded on 9 and 10 July, the Dutch
UN contingent defending the ‘safe area’ put up no resistance. Around thirty of their
number were held hostage at the time, but they also lacked backup support, equipment or
the will to impede the Serbs in any way.81
It would be easy to point the finger of liability at the Dutch soldiers for allowing the
genocide and ethnic cleansing which ensued at Srebrenica to occur, but they were not solely
responsible. They were peacekeeping soldiers of the United Nations under orders to keep the
peace without taking sides. This massacre revealed the UN to be incapable of bringing about
peace as long as its structure remained the same.
Action was quickly taken by the UN following the events at Srebrenica, but by that time
over 8,000 Muslim men and boys had been murdered in Srebrenica alone. Though similar
atrocities were and had been taking place elsewhere for many years, this was unique in that it
was within a UN declared “safe area.” Srebrenica was a major reality check for the international
community on the limitations of remaining neutral. It was difficult to accept that it would take a
horrific example like Srebrenica to get the UN to finally flex its muscles and say enough was
enough and that the many other deaths prior to this had not been reason enough to act. As a
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body created to keep the peace and preserve justice following World War II, the UN failed in
Bosnia and the rest of former Yugoslavia to uphold the basic laws on which it was built. The
UN has learned valuable lessons from Bosnia, but the Bosnian people paid a tragically high cost
for that which was learned much too late.82
That Srebrenica even happened was a consequence of the greatest mistake the UN made;
the mistake of allowing too much time to pass before major actions were taken to stop the
Serbian aggressors. The worst fears of those whom had speculated what could happen if war
came to Bosnia were realized when it finally did in April 1992, and time became the greatest ally
of leaders like Karadzic and Mladic. The Bosnian Serb army, and what remained of a
predominantly Serbian Yugoslav army, was initially quick to sweep in and overwhelm those that
stood in their way. With superior armaments and military leadership experience they were able
to overrun more than half of the country. And afterward, they began undermining all the work
that had taken place in Bosnia’s prior forty years as a part of Yugoslavia in moving towards
becoming a more pluralistic society. The long negotiation process that followed allowed for
sniper and mortar fire to slowly destroy both the lives and beliefs of a population that still
desired a society in which the different ethnic groups could coexist and thrive together. This
then made it possible for the stronger and more corrupt to move in and dictate the future of
Bosnia once the war finally ended.
United Nations and the United States
At the time, one of the major questions regarding the crisis in the Balkans was, “[Could]
the U.S. and Europe allow a military crackdown in Yugoslavia? The event would certainly
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undermine the whole concept of European security and stability.”83 This was true. Had no
containment policies been attempted, the war could have spread outside the borders of
Yugoslavia, upsetting European stability. The last thing the U.S. and Europe wanted was an
unstable dictatorship in Europe after seeing the Soviet Union finally fall. Thus, it follows that a
peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis was desirable.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and with it an end to the Cold War, it comes as no
surprise that much of Eastern Europe was thrown into chaos. Though Yugoslavia had existed
apart from the Soviet Union, the vacuum left by the absence of a suitable strong handed dictator
to take Tito’s place after his death allowed the fires of nationalism to make their way into its
republics. Some, like Milosevic in Serbia and to a lesser extent Tudjman in Croatia, used
nationalism as a means to unite their entire ethnic group together in one border much like
Germany had done earlier in the century. Milosevic appeared more like the communist dictators
of old in his pursuit of achieving a Greater Serbia by using the means given him as leader of the
state. Others, like Izetbegovic in Bosnia, had a more multiethnic vision of nationalism and their
pursuit of a future apart from communism united them and other nations and republics pursuing
democracy to the national interests of the U.S. While the Cold War was over, the U.S. goal of
spreading democracy was not.
Thus, the United States approach to dealing with the Bosnian War possessed the same
two major objectives as the United Nation’s and NATO’s. Repeatedly, Clinton stated the two
clearest objectives to be that “we want the conflict to be contained, and we want the slaughter
and the ethnic cleansing to stop.”84 He also maintained that this would require working with the
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allies within the UN and NATO regardless of his agreement or disagreement with their policies.
In doing so, Clinton tied the U.S. to the UN and Europe in whatever decisions would play out in
Bosnia starting early in 1993. Things would not change until 1995.
There were a number of key changes which took place in 1995 in leadership, firepower,
and policy—turning the tide for the U.S. involving itself in Bosnia. Francois Mitterrand was
replaced by Jacques Chirac as the president of France on May 17 of that year.85 He then “talked
with John Major about the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force, an elite French-British unit, far
better armed with much heavier weapons, which, with American air support and helicopters,
could move quickly and strike the Serbs with genuine force if they violated any more
agreements.”86 When Major agreed, this put the two nations which had stood most firmly in the
way of stronger action in Yugoslavia on the side of politicians in the U.S. that wanted to be more
forceful in responding to Serb aggression.
Leadership also changed hands over command of airpower from the UN, which had been
too Serbocentric under Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and was therefore “compromised,” to
NATO which saw Bosnia as a part of its sphere of influence where it could not afford to fail.87
Taking the UN out of the hierarchy of airpower simplified the command structure making it
easier and quicker to call in air support.
In addition, Croatian forces which had been trained by former U.S. army officers “could
for the first time match the Serbs in firepower.”88 The Serbs did well early in the war largely
because of their superiority in firepower. As long as they held that edge, neither the Croatians
nor the Bosnian Muslims could stand up to them in battle.
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In the U.S., Bob Dole, the Senate majority leader at the time, was “advocating a
resolution that called for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. He appeared to have the votes
in both the House and the Senate to pass the resolution, and in case the president vetoed it, the
votes to override the veto.”89 This meant that Clinton would have the backing of Congress if he
decided to pursue a more active role in Bosnia. The changes in Europe also made it possible to
realistically consider a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo and united military front.
Most importantly, the U.S. also finally possessed the leadership and will to act decisively.
Clinton was a strong domestic policy president, but weak in foreign policy—his proficiency in
which was limited to that of his advisers. By 1995, there were three key individuals whom had
joined his team of advisers that made the difference in Bosnia. The first individual was General
John Shalikashvili. He became the head of the joint chiefs in fall of 1993 replacing Colin
Powell. Over the next few years Shalikashvili proved himself to be a highly capable leader and
made his greatest mark when he proposed going directly to a massive air campaign with the
objective of taking out the Serbs’ air defense systems, “thereby sending them the first of what
might be a series of messages.”90 This would not be a small retaliatory gesture to Serb
aggression. It would be a firm statement of what would come in the future if they continued to
act as they had throughout the war to this point. Shalikashvili was not intimidated.
The second individual was William “Bill” Perry who became Clinton’s Secretary of
Defense in February of 1994. Perry was a highly intelligent individual with a Ph.D. in
mathematics who had served as undersecretary for research and engineering under Carter, and he
proposed a number of changes for both the U.S. and UN military tactics in Bosnia.91 The first
proposition he made was similar to Shalikashvili’s in calling for “massive high-technology
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bombing” or “carpet bombing.” This would not be like the inefficient carpet bombing of World
War II. Instead, it would be a strong assault on Serb positions using precision bombing
technology to overwhelm them with their ability to bomb accurately and with great magnitude.
However, the aerial bombing would only be one part of the assault.
Another tactical change was the consolidation of the many scattered, smaller units of UN
troops into “units of a thousand men or more” with sufficient firepower to hold off the Serbs
until air cover arrived. This would take away the ability of the Serb forces to capture UN troops
and hold them as hostages in order to make demands. “Meanwhile, a team of American, British,
and French generals would meet with the Bosnian Serb leaders to warn them that if they tried
anything from now on, we would pound them as they had never been pounded before.”92 These
tactics would show that the years of bowing to Serb aggression were over. The international
community was finally empowered to control the situation.
The final figure was the biggest advocate of Bosnia and the plight of the people there and
proved to be the greatest hero of this tragedy on the U.S. side of things. Richard Holbrooke was
considered by some to be the “most talented candidate” for secretary of state when Clinton was
looking to first fill the position, but he had the most enemies of any of the candidates.93
Holbrooke was not afraid to step on toes, but Clinton did not want a secretary of state that would
push him too hard in foreign policy. Thus, he lost out on this position and others having to settle
for ambassador to Germany. Holbrooke did not disappear, however, and following Srebrenica
he was called on to take a leading role in Bosnia. Despite his faults which made him could make
him a political liability at times, Holbrooke “was also decisive and audacious, willing to do some
things wrong in order to do other things right, willing above all to take risks for policies he
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believed in.”94 He believed that things could be different in Bosnia, and he made them so. Each
of these individuals and the changes which took place in the personnel and postures of the
leaders in Europe ensured that the intervention in Bosnia would be different in 1995.
Media Framing
Throughout the Bosnian War, the media played an integral part in reporting what was
taking place in Bosnia to those that were not present there. Out of these reports, opinions were
formed about how the U.S. should be involved. However, these reports were not perfect in their
coverage of the conflict.
Public opinion played a large role in the development of the United States’ foreign
policy with Bosnia throughout the conflict. Newspaper articles and televised broadcasts led
average U.S. citizens to develop a conscience for the injustices occurring in a country which they
otherwise might never have heard of or cared about. Ask around today and most people still
have no idea where Bosnia is. Yet in a democratic nation like the United States, public polls
play a significant role in the policy of the administration in office. At the time of the Bosnian
War, “the two most important developments in American politics were the use of polling and
television advertising, both of them joined together in zeroing in on and then manipulating what
the voting public thought at a given moment.95 With the advent of CNN, news was accessible
twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, and Bosnia was a big story. Perhaps a more
poignant question was whether what was being seen was an accurate representation of what was
happening. Historian James J. Sadkovich did not believe so.
In reality, victims who died on a weekend, or far from TV minicams, or in a forest deep
inside Bosnia made little or no sound, because few journalists worked weekends—or
from 7:00 P.M. in the evening to 10:00 A.M. the next morning, or in Bosnia’s forests; TV
journalists have a window from 10:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. when they gather news for the
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prime-time slot. Journalists stayed in major cities because access to occupied areas was
limited. By limiting access, the Serbians diverted more attention to Croatian and Bosnian
territories. As a result, human rights violations and war crimes by Croatians and
Bosnians were exaggerated by UN officials and a media anxious for copy, whereas
genocide in Serbian areas was not even reported—unless the potential or actual victim
was an American.96
Just as national interest had played a role in judging whether Bosnia had anything to offer the
U.S. or its allies, the concern for U.S. soldiers, journalists, and civilians also prevailed over the
sufferings of the Bosnian people experiencing the worst of the tragedy. And it was no different
for the international forces there. The fact is that “wars are fought not only with arms, but also
with words.”97 However, words can also lead to inaction. Therefore, it is important to
understand the differences, if any, which existed in how the war in Bosnia was being portrayed
compared to other conflicts going on around the same time, such as the war in Iraq. Differences
in definition could elicit completely opposite reactions from the public.
When the war in Bosnia broke out, the Bush administration and media took the stance
that this war did not represent a conflict which the U.S. could entangle itself in. For Bush,
Bosnia was different from the Persian Gulf. In justifying U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf,
Bush and the media acclaimed the ‘American’ ideals of justice and freedom to win public
support. The presence of oil did not hurt either. These same ideals were not used in regard to
Bosnia. Clinton took a different stance in saying, “I am appalled by what has happened there; I
am saddened; I am sickened. And I know that our ability to do anything about it is somewhat
limited.”98 Neither presidents liked what was happening in Bosnia, nor were they initially
willing to take a strong stance in proposing that action follow words. Essentially, the media was
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a major factor in the Bosnian War in reporting what was happening to those who were watching
it from afar. However, the media was limited in what it could show by forces within Bosnia and
abroad, and the politicians of the U.S. put their own spin on what was taking place in order to
justify their actions, or lack their of.
United States Involvement
One major question often posed in situations requiring international response in today’s
world is, “What does our country have to gain by getting involved?” Until moral grounds were
given for the United States to involve itself, the U.S. had nothing of strategic value to gain out of
the war in Bosnia. The Soviet Union was gone, so there was no need for Yugoslavia to act as a
thorn in the side of the Soviet Union and communist solidarity anymore. Bosnia also had little to
offer the U.S. in terms of natural resources, like oil, which offered a stark contrast between the
Persian Gulf War and the war in Bosnia. As the U.S. weighed the costs and benefits of engaging
in this overseas crisis, it must have been difficult to see any scenario in which there might be
something to gain. This was different for the Europeans who were not only closer in proximity
but also saw this as their own special moment in history. “The Europeans, eager to show the
force and muscle of a newly united continent, were anxious to play a decisive role on this issue.
Later it would be clear that they had greatly overestimated their influence, but there was no
doubt about their enthusiasm for the task at first.”99 The Europeans also greatly overestimated
their unity, but they answered the call of the Secretary General for troops and were a part of
UNPROFOR when it was established in February 1992 by Resolution 743 of the Security
Council. And “because they had troops on the ground in Bosnia and the crisis was taking place
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in their backyards, the Europeans had significant stakes in the conflict.”100 Thus, initially the
U.S. took a back seat.
During this time, there were tough decisions for the U.S. as well with their own
government in transition. Risk was involved for the U.S. in determining whether it should push
the UN to try something different or let the UN and European Community continue to take the
lead in Bosnia. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the start of the Bosnian War aligned with an
election year (1992) and became a part of the debate between George H. W. Bush, who was
running for reelection, and Bill Clinton. When Clinton won, a new administration with a new set
of advisors moved in and had to decide whether to continue the prior administration’s policy in
Bosnia or plot a new course. Therefore, the two administrations must be dealt with separately in
terms of why they would or would not have wanted to get involved.
When events in Yugoslavia began to unravel in 1991, the possibility of intervening was
extremely unattractive to the Bush administration, and the president and his advisers had a
number of reasons for not wanting to involve themselves in the conflict. Dennis Ross, an
American diplomat and author with extensive experience working with both republican and
democrat presidencies, gave five reasons for why action in Bosnia was not desirable. First, the
United States’ main focus was on the unraveling Soviet Union. Second, the administration felt
that it was a European problem which should be solved by the Europeans. Third, there was a
fear that intervention would require a strong military action which seemed unlikely to gain public
approval at the time. Fourth, the administration was tired from having moved from one foreign
policy situation to the next throughout the term. Lastly, because there had been so much
emphasis placed on foreign policy, there were now many “domestic realities” which needed to
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be tended to before committing the U.S. to yet another foreign endeavor.101 George C. Herring,
a historian and leading authority on U.S. foreign relations, echoed all of these reasons and added
two more: Yugoslavia was no longer geopolitically significant now that the Cold War had ended,
and “memories of Vietnam still held sway.”102 These were legitimate reasons for a president to
not want to get involved. Added to this was the complexity of an election which President Bush
hoped to win. This was a less legitimate reason from a moral standpoint, but it still weighed into
the equation due to the nature of U.S. politics. Regardless of whether one would consider these
valid reasons, they influenced the Bush administration’s foreign policy.
The Secretary of State under President Bush, James Baker, revealed the U.S. position on
Bosnia early on. He stated that “while the United States wanted to see Yugoslavia’s territorial
integrity preserved, it would welcome any federal restructuring accepted by the republics.”103 So
the U.S. was willing to accept changes if they were unanimously agreed upon by all the
republics. Baker also displayed an understanding of just how far things had deteriorated.
“Logical argument simply will not work at this stage, when ethnic and nationalist passions
suppressed by 45 years of Communist rule are exploding to the surface.”104 Secretary of State,
Lawrence Eagleburger, also presented the U.S. position clearly when he said, “We would be
strongly opposed to any use of force or intimidation to settle political differences, change
external or internal borders, block democratic change, or impose a nondemocratic unity.”105 The
use of force by any of the republics to effect change was deemed unacceptable, but the
impending violence revealed these threats to be empty. The wording was strong but
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noncommittal, and a Balkan crisis which had moved beyond resolving with a “logical argument”
required a firm commitment to have any impact. Perhaps President Bush would have acted had
he won a second term, instead threats were as far as his administration ventured. Thus, the
situation continued to be unresolved leading into the Clinton Administration.
It also seemed odd that the Bush administration was not taking a strong stance on Bosnia
due to the action taken in the Persian Gulf, though there are few comparisons which can be made
between the Persian Gulf War and the war in Yugoslavia. The Bush Administration acted
quickly and powerfully in responding to Saddam Hussein’s aggressive action against Kuwait.
“Aggressors must not be allowed to profit from their conquests. That’s the principle President
Bush soundly invoked to mobilize the world against Saddam Hussein’s seizure of Kuwait. The
lesson seems to have been entirely lost on Slobodan Milosevic.”106 The Bush Administration
changed to a more timid position in Yugoslavia when it was determined that the US would only
“try to use its influence to limit further expansion by the Serbs” despite their role as
aggressors.107 The administration continued to merely threaten while following the lead of the
European Community. Eventually steps which did not require force were taken to try to stop the
fighting. These took the forms of economic sanctions and an arms embargo against Yugoslavia,
which were supported by the U.S. and Canada, and the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, and
Bosnia as independent nations. However, the efforts continued to do little to stop the aggression
of Milosevic and his Serbian Yugoslav army. The fact of the matter was that there was a stark
difference between the United States’ position in the Persian Gulf and its position in Yugoslavia,
and many at the time, and many today, point to the fact that the Persian Gulf possessed oil, and
Bosnia did not.
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Whether the public is aware of it or not, national interest plays a large role in creating
foreign policy. The U.S. has a large national interest in ensuring that oil continues to flow into
the country. All one has to do is look at the U.S. public’s response to high gas prices in order
understand that the price of oil has a strong impact on public sentiment. Individuals like Lee
Hamilton, the Democratic Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs from 19931995, argued against lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and laughed on television “when he
noted that it was unfortunate for the Bosnians that unlike Kuwait there was no oil in their country
which might have made Bosnia’s resources, if not its population, a strategic interest to the
US.”108 Many believed that “if Kuwait were not rich in oil, the West would not have rushed half
a million soldiers to the Persian Gulf,” and they were probably right.109 National and strategic
interests are essential ingredients in determining foreign policy. The United States had a
strategic interest in Yugoslavia while Tito was in power because the Soviet Union still existed as
competition. The Soviet Union’s collapse took away the one real chip that Yugoslavia had in
keeping the attention of the U.S. and its foreign policy.
Under the Bush administration, the U.S. leadership also over emphasized what its role in
Yugoslavia would have to look like. Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
under Bush, said that intervention in Bosnia would require an “all-or-nothing” attack with clear
objectives and a desire to win quickly.110 Haunted by the shadow of Vietnam, Powell could not
get past the what-ifs. The most frightening of questions being “what would happen if the Serbs
suffered heavy initial casualties from our high-tech weaponry, but instead of folding their hand
and bowing to pressure, acted like the proud warrior nation they were long reputed to be, broke
their forces down into smaller guerrilla-like units, and used the harsh terrain to their advantage
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and continued to attack their neighbors?”111 The U.S. could not afford another Vietnam, so
“Powell deliberately exaggerated the number of troops112 that would be needed” in order to scare
off advocates of intervention.113 The war was eventually brought to an end without this ‘all-ornothing’ approach, so this was not entirely accurate. However, had the U.S. acted unilaterally in
bringing an end to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, a ground force would have been required
along with the air power it eventually did utilize, so Powell might have been proven correct. But
the U.S. under Clinton chose to work with the international community instead, so this option
never received a high priority.
Clinton received a lot of praise for the eventual end of the Bosnian War due to his
position as president when it happened, but his administration was prone to equal amounts of
unsupported talking points and inaction as the prior administration. Had it not been for the
people Clinton eventually surrounded himself with, his administration may have failed in
Yugoslavia as well. This was largely due to how much emphasis Clinton placed on foreign
policy. When comparing the two presidents, Halberstam pointed to their stances on foreign
policy as a major difference between the two. “For Bush, foreign policy had been his raison
d’être. For Clinton, it was an inconvenience, something that might pull him away from his
primary job at hand—domestic issues, above all the economy.”114 For Herring, all one had to do
was look at two of his closest advisers and where their experience came from to understand this.
“His top foreign policy advisers, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Secretary of State
Warren Christopher, a protégé of Cyrus Vance, came mainly out of the liberal Democratic
mold—burned by Vietnam, nervous about unilateral intervention, committed to working through
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the UN and other international organizations.”115 These advisers would not push Clinton on
foreign policy. As previously examined, it was only when other advisers were brought in that
Clinton’s administration took action in Bosnia.
The United States held a new and unique position entering the 1990s. As the world’s
sole superpower, and possessing the largest, most powerful military, the U.S. possessed the
military might to act alone in areas like Bosnia if a firm action was required. This placed it in a
great position of power and influence. There were also a number of reasons for wanting to get
involved. Wayne Bert found these by looking at members of the administration.
Peter Tarnoff, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in the Clinton
Administration gave three reasons the U.S. had an interest in events in Yugoslavia: to
prevent the spread of fighting and the resultant instability that could threaten our allies or
Russia; to stem the flow of refugees, provide humanitarian relief and stop the slaughter;
and for the U.S. to maintain a leadership role in European affairs.116
Yet there was never the will to act or place U.S. soldiers into harm’s way. For instance, public
opinion had soured quickly in Somalia in 1993 with footage of a U.S. soldier’s corpse being
dragged through the street despite earlier public support for intervention. Nineteen soldiers died
in Somalia, and most consider the mission there to be “in all ways a fiasco.”117 With this recent
action in mind, public opinion could only be trusted to remember the most recent actions
broadcast.
In Bosnia and elsewhere, Clinton made it clear that “when we commit ourselves to
working with our neighbors, through NATO, through the U.N., through the Organization of
American States, through any other group, that we have to be prepared not to always have our

115

Herring, 925-926.
Wayne Bert, The Reluctant Superpower: United States’ Policy in Bosnia, 1991-1995. (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 68-69.
117
Halberstam, 264.
116

57

way just prevail overnight.”118 Despite disagreeing with the way in which some decisions were
being made, like Bush before him, Clinton was willing to acquiesce to the Europeans since the
situation in Bosnia had the most potential to affect them. This humility in leadership earned the
U.S. credibility and good standing internationally and ensured that the U.S. would not lose
backing in other areas of the world where it possessed the backing of the UN and NATO such as
the economic sanctions which existed against Iraq.
International power and perception were not the only objectives the U.S. under Clinton
pursued. Another primary goal of the U.S. was to ensure that the crisis in the Balkans would not
become “a broader European conflict, especially one that could threaten our NATO allies or
undermine the transition of former Communist states to peaceful democracies.”119 Unrest in the
Balkans, the “powder keg” of Europe, was not to be taken lightly. Events there had led to major
European conflicts in the past, thus any effort to contain the conflict was encouraged. This was
due to the U.S. and UN being concerned that the ethnic cleansing taking place in Bosnia “could
have other practical consequences in other nearby regions where the same sorts of ethnic
tensions exist[ed].”120 Bosnia and Croatia were not the sole possessors of ethnically diverse
populations with troubled pasts.
The other republics of former Yugoslavia had experienced population diffusion
throughout their recent and distant histories leading to majority and minority ethnic populations
being found within their borders, and these groups could just as easily have recalled accounts of
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former sins committed by those outside their ethnic group. This was the case in all the republics
of former Yugoslavia as it was in many of the nations that once fell behind the Iron Curtain, and
the international community could not afford a domino effect taking place sending Europe once
again into chaos and ruin. Thus, it was in everyone’s best interests to see this unrest end here
and find a way to bring the opposing groups to the table together to work out their differences
and grievances and move toward reconciliation. Unfortunately, there is still much work to be
done even today and will be for years to come. Currently, there remains a UN military presence
in the country because of this. Since 2004, there has been a European Union led contingent of
1600 UN troops present within Bosnia with the possibility of that number rising to 7000 in case
hostilities ever arose again. Known as EUFOR ALTHEA121, their charter lasts until November
of 2011.
According to Clinton, the U.S. also wanted to ensure that NATO remained “a credible
force for peace in the post-cold-war era.”122 As “the world’s greatest military alliance,” NATO
could not afford to sit idly by while the slaughter continued to happen in Bosnia without losing
some credibility. And NATO’s charter echoed the UN charter in its purpose “to settle any
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security and justice [were] not endangered.” Therefore, they agreed to
assist the UN in monitoring that sanctions were being complied with at a meeting in Helsinki on
July 10, 1992 which then set a precedent for them to assist throughout the ensuing four years of
the war and after. They would later be put to work controlling the skies over Bosnia with the
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passing on October 9, 1992 of UN Security Council Resolution 781 creating a no-fly zone for
non-NATO or UN flights and the eventual strategic bombing campaign against the Bosnian
Serbs and Yugoslav army regulars on the ground in Bosnia.
It would be too harsh to say that the actions of those taking the lead at the end of the
twentieth century in resolving situations like those in Bosnia and elsewhere made their decisions
lightly. Clinton put it best towards the end of his time as president when he said that:
Too often we forget that 1989 was also a time of grave uncertainty about the future.
There were doubts about NATO's future, reinforced later by its slowness to confront evil
in Bosnia and Croatia. There were fears that the EU's efforts to come closer together
would either fail or, succeeding, would fatally divide Europe and the United States. The
countries of Central and Eastern Europe feared becoming a gray zone of poverty and
insecurity. Many wondered if Russia was headed for a Communist backlash or a
nationalist coup.123
Essentially, the future was anything but certain in the 1990s. Nobody knew how events were
going to unfold or whether the world would be a more stable and united place. Everyone could
hope for that, but it was clear that the leaders of the “free world” were anything but certain that
that was the future to come or even whether that was where there decisions were leading.
No conflict is ever the same, but there are lessons which can be learned and applied
elsewhere. This should always be the stance of bodies like the United Nations, NATO and the
United States. By always looking to improve themselves and the actions they take, they can
pursue positive actions with more beneficiary returns in the future. Though much of this paper
has focused on detailing what was missed by those in the international community in being able
to determine what was to come in Yugoslavia, it is worth reiteration that, despite failures like
these, there were also successes which should be examined in order to learn how better to deal
with crises such as the Bosnia one in the future.
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The situation was not an easy one for those involving themselves with the pursuit of
peace in Bosnia and the rest of a crumbling Yugoslavia. One major hurdle the international
community faced was the recent collapse of the Soviet Union and an end to the Cold War. “It
(Bosnia) ha[d] become for better or worse a paradigm for the problem of regional conflict
management in the post-Cold-War era.”124 The Cold War had defined international relations
since the end of World War II. Thus, the crisis in Yugoslavia represented one of the first
attempts at resolving a conflict in a Communist nation without the threat of the Soviet Union
looming. The United States now stood alone as the sole superpower in the world, but the
government was still hesitant to act out unilaterally. This was made clear early on by President
Bush as he declared, “We are not the world’s policeman.”125 After all, the country “was more
powerful and more influential than ever before, but it was looking inward.”126 With Clinton’s
focus on domestic policy, there appeared to be little to be gained by the U.S. intervening in the
Balkans. It was only after the moral grounds to intercede became politically feasible that Bosnia
became interesting. Ultimately, Wayne Bert put it best in stating that the U.S. and others
involved were “unprepared to pay the price necessary to prevent or stop” the genocide taking
place in Yugoslavia or any of the other countries like Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia and Sudan that
were experiencing conflict.127
Positive Contributions from the U.S. in Ending the Conflict
Though the U.S. interceded late, they did eventually respond and help bring the conflict
to an end. Had the U.S. continued to remain out of the conflict, the war may have gone on for
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even longer with the Europeans unable or unwilling to take action themselves. However, the
U.S. only acted when it became politically feasible to break with the European consensus and
pursue a new agenda. “In the fall of 1994, there may have been reason enough to stand firm
with the allies because the domestic pressure before the midterm elections had temporarily
changed the relative payoffs for collaboration on the administration’s preferred policy and
collaboration on a compromise.”128 Politics again played a factor in the decision to hold off on
taking any action in Bosnia. Clinton only pushed for a change in procedure following the events
at Srebrenica when “nonconfrontation became politically untenable.”129 After this, he
“threatened the allies in October and November 1994 that he would lift the arms embargo,” and
the Europeans were quick to change their own policies and collaborate with the United States in
bringing the war in Bosnia to an end.130
The policy which Clinton pursued was a ‘lift-and-strike’ policy which did not include the
use of ground troops as was initially thought would be required in a unilateral venture.131 The
UN already had peacekeeping forces in place, so it was proposed that the arms embargo first be
lifted so that Bosnia could arm and defend itself. This proposal had been pushed by Izetbegovic
in Bosnia since the war first broke out. The second proposal was to begin airstrikes against Serb
positions to be continued indefinitely until the Serbs gave up their ground in the hills above
Bosnian cities like Sarajevo which had been under siege for the entirety of the war. Both of
these proposals turned out to be successful actions.
The airstrikes proved especially successful for a number of reasons. Airstrikes at the end
of the twentieth century were far different from those carried out in World War II.
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Indiscriminate bombings were no longer acceptable as a means to achieve military success. The
very use of indiscriminate mortar fire by the Serbs against the civilian population in Bosnia
helped to turn the international community against them. Therefore, the U.S. and its allies had to
consider the cost of collateral damage into their strategy. U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Commander
Michael Ryan was in charge of figuring out options to pursue in airstrikes at this time. His plan
took the name Operation Deliberate Force and it disclosed much about what modern warfare and
peacekeeping had to take into account in determining what policies were both acceptable and
implementable.
“Ryan’s target selection reveals much about how his mission, prior planning, and
political constraints shaped his concept of operations.”132 The first of Ryan’s objectives was to
end the siege of Sarajevo. In order to achieve this objective, his secondary mission would be the
specific targeting of military “forces and facilities that supported threats to the UN mission on
the ground.” With these objectives in mind, the final mission would be for Ryan to obtain the
approval of the UN to proceed.133 After being approved, all military moves were to be observed
closely to ensure that there could be no fallout over the situation. This put great pressure on
commanders like Ryan. “Convinced that ‘every bomb was a political bomb…Ryan felt obliged
to exercise such close control to minimize the risk of error,’ and ‘if mistakes were made, to
ensure that they would be attributable to him—and to him alone.’”134 Despite immense pressure,
Ryan achieved his goals. Amazingly, the collateral damage was kept relatively low in Bosnia,
setting a precedent for future actions in military engagements.
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One of the primary targets of the airstrikes was the supply lines of the Serbs. This action
was taken after looking at the successes other armies had achieved in dividing an enemy from its
supplies. For centuries this had been a successful ploy of militaries. The military leaders would
have understood that “suddenly deprived of its supplies of men and material, a conventional
army at war risks defeat by its adversaries, precisely the situation that confronted the BSA
leadership in 1995.”135 When their positions were finally attacked and their supplies cut off, they
were presented with a situation they could not win.
The Serbs were simultaneously hit by a new offensive of Croatians and Bosnians. “On
August 4, the Croats struck against the Serbs in the Krajina, heading toward Bihac in an
offensive called Operation Storm. The Serb forces completely disintegrated and the Croat
offensive became a major rout.”136 These forces succeeded largely due to U.S. training and the
psychological lift that came of it.137 With massive precision bombing and vengeful Croatians
and Bosnians now headed towards them, the Serbian leadership quickly decided to negotiate.
The bloodshed was finally brought to an end, and the change in borders brought by the CroatBosnian offensive made Dayton possible.
Unfortunately, peace was only achieved after the complete destruction of the country and
its people. Every facet of Bosnia had been devastated by the war. For one thing, most of the
industries which had existed prior to the war breaking out were now rendered useless due to their
need for spare parts from elsewhere in Bosnia and the other former republics of Yugoslavia. “Of
its 4.3 million inhabitants (1991 figure), 1.2 million were refugees in host countries and another
1 million were internally displaced persons, not to mention the 250,000 estimated dead and
missing, and the 200,000 wounded.” Bosnian Muslims were almost entirely driven out of
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eastern Bosnia which was now occupied predominantly by Serbs. Most Serbs had been driven
out of western Bosnia which was now largely Croatian and Muslim. Croats were highly
diminished in number in central Bosnia which now became primarily Muslim. “Every major
Bosnian city found itself devoid of a large part of its pre-war population or facing the prospect of
partition (Mostar).”138 The future of Bosnia looked grim at best following the tragedies of the
past four years. Thus, it was little wonder that those who would now lead in the restoration and
recovery of this broken nation had a momentous task ahead. In addition, even in the wake of
tragedy, Bosnia again became the victim to those of the international community who thought
they knew best in the pursuit of peace.
The Dayton Peace Accords
Hindsight tends to give historical narrative a sense of inevitability. But there was nothing
predetermined about the outcome of the Bosnia negotiations. In August 1995, when they
began, it was almost universally believed that they would fail, as all previous efforts had.
And we knew that if we failed, the war would continue.139 – Richard Holbrooke
The war in Bosnia officially ended with the initialing of the Dayton Peace Accords on
November 21, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio. The documents were then signed in Paris on December 14
of the same year.140 The agreement was made between the leaders of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (what remained of
it). The agreement was excellent for the peace it represented, but there were problems with the
way in which it was pursued. The largest problem presented itself in the fact that Tudjman and
Milosevic were given a seat at the table. “For two aggressors who had wrought untold misery in
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Bosnia to be placed in such a position showed how flawed the 1995 settlement was.”141 Giving
them a seat at the table gave credibility to their rules and revealed the international community
and United States to be weak against aggressors. The other side of this argument, however, was
that Tudjman and Milosevic were the only leaders that could represent the opposing elements at
this time with the only strong alternatives being other individuals that were just as guilty. No
one wanted Mladic or Karadzic at the negotiating table, or others like them, but they were the
leaders of their respective constituencies so they had to be dealt with. Regardless, the following
year, elections were held which allowed for nationalist elites to come to power over individuals
that truly valued democracy. “Holding these elections in a demolished society, where the
wounds of war were still fresh, revealed the poverty of vision and incoherence of the architects
of Dayton and would store up endless trouble for the future.”142 The country and its government
are still paying for this lack of insight.
Rebuilding Bosnia
After achieving peace and stability in the region, the international community next
pursued its rebuilding. The work of rebuilding Bosnia following the war bore its share of
problems. A clear bias emerged in the way in which the Western societies viewed how Bosnia
and other nations should be shaped regardless of their history and culture. Gallagher, a British
historian with an emphasis in religion and conflict in modern Europe, summed up this approach
best in his book The Balkans after the Cold War. He said that “for good or for ill, Bosnia reflects
the dominant approach to nation building, which consists of international support for a settlement
between warring parties; help in setting up the country’s governing structures; and economic
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assistance to restructure the state, financial institutions, and civil society.”143 This is the exact
pattern that was used in Bosnia. The United States and its Western allies set up the peace
agreement at Dayton. They then determined what form the government would take and held
elections thinking more about immediacy than the long term effects of the elections’ outcomes.
Finally, they continued to give economic assistance and political guidance. What they failed to
recognize was that the structure of their own nations might not be the ideal structure for the
rebuilding of Bosnia or other formerly communist states. Gallagher called this view by the West
a “liberal internationalist world view” that made the assumption that future states would all look
like their own “secular, democratic states.” Thus, their goal for Bosnia and others like it was not
just to rebuild the state. Instead the Western powers would pursue the creation of “multiethnic,
secular, and capitalist states” without regard to the “country’s past, its culture, or the
particularities of recent history.”144
By accepting that their states were the prime examples that others should be modeled off
of, the international community denied the possibility to other nations of pursuing selfdetermination despite all the differences they might have possessed or how difficult the journey
might be towards creating such a state and society. By doing so, they revealed themselves to be
arrogant and incapable of finding the right solution for the future of Bosnia. Until this arrogance
can be resolved, this will continue to be a problem in state building.
As a solution, McMahon suggests that “more attention should be paid to the similarities
between Bosnia and other former Communist states and to what has helped these states move
toward stability and democracy.”145 The United States is unique in its composition as are the
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other Western nations with a history of democracy. Democracy is an excellent system of
government, but there cannot be one, and only one way of creating democracy and the ideals it
represents when nation building. Rebuilding without a thought as to the customs and traditions
of the people in the nation being invested in exposes an arrogant view that the investor’s way of
doing things is in all ways superior to the national models. As the world becomes more
globalized, and the more powerful countries and international bodies like the U.N. continue to
intervene in the affairs of the less powerful, there must be a movement towards learning about
and appreciating the differences other cultures possess. Future policy must not be shaped by
politicians alone, but also by city and regional planners and those in the liberal arts who have
invested time and energy in understanding the customs and cultures that are being affected.
Lessons for the Future
Justice is a popular word in politics today. Politicians tout it as a cornerstone of their
campaigns. College campuses, like Cal Poly, host events which encourage dialogue about social
justice issues. News agencies report daily the wrongs being committed around the world. Even
Hollywood has taken part in the move for justice by making movies focusing on actual tragedies
which have occurred (Hotel Rwanda), or making their audience aware of issues like racism
which continue to exist in our society today (Crash). Talk of justice and injustice is all around,
however the ability to internationally intervene in conflicts where injustices are taking place is a
bureaucratic nightmare. The Bosnian War was the source of numerous injustices at the end of
the twentieth century. The response by those who charged themselves with bringing justice to
the situation was slow at best, and thousands of people died as a result of this sluggish response.
Thus it is necessary to understand that the positive outcomes of the international effort to end the
war should not overshadow the atrocities that came before it. The Bosnian War is a part of
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history now, and it is a history which must be learned from in order to ensure it does not happen
again.
The most significant lesson which must be taken from the Bosnian War is that inaction
and ignorance can be as damaging as taking sides, if not more so. Once the international
community took a role in negotiating a peace, they became responsible, at least in part, for what
would follow. By then declaring neutrality in the matter, they eliminated their ability to dissuade
aggression or even find an aggressor. Thus, the war was allowed to escalate. There were
reasons for not wanting to get involved—Balkans as powder keg of Europe, fear of new
Vietnam, was a civil war, ancient hatreds, etc. However, it would have been morally repugnant
to stand back and let the people of the Balkans just kill each other off, even more so with the
presence of genocide.
Another lesson to be learned is that the eradication of injustice requires that risks be
taken. The Bosnian War ended at Dayton because the U.S. took a risk. More risks like this must
be taken in the future. In order to accomplish this, politicians and others in positions of influence
must begin pursuing and fighting for what is right more often than what is merely popular at the
time. This is understandably difficult, especially in a democracy where public opinion can make
or break a career, but Clinton and the negotiators at Dayton made choices which resulted in
ending genocide in Bosnia. And ending genocide and other crimes against humanity are always
worth the risk. The greatest risk taker, Holbrooke, fought for and pursued the peace process
through to its end only to be rejected by the administration following Dayton, but he helped save
generations of Bosnians in the process and is the hero of this story in history.
Since November 21, 1995, “Dayton” has entered the language as shorthand for a certain
type of diplomacy—the Big Bang approach to negotiations: lock everyone up until they
reach agreement…Those considering other Daytons should proceed with caution. It is a
high-wire act without a safety net. Much work must precede the plunge into an all-or69

nothing environment. The site must be just right. The goals must be clearly defined. A
single host nation must be in firm control, but it is high risk for the host, whose prestige is
on the line. The consequences of failure are great. But when the conditions are right, a
Dayton can produce dramatic results.146
Hopefully more Daytons are on the horizon for ending future conflicts. No situation will ever be
just like Bosnia again, however the risk and determination of the leaders at Dayton proved that
even complex conflicts can eventually end in peace, even if that peace is tenuous.
The massacre which took place at Srebrenica might have looked different had leaders
been willing to take a risk. The troops on the ground bore some responsibility, but the greater
issue was the lack of commitment on the part of their leaders in the UN. The number of troops
which were initially sent represented a lack of will on the part of the international community to
send a message that aggression would not be tolerated. By pulling out of the safe zone they sent
an even clearer message that they could be pushed around as the UN placed more value on its
troops than the Bosnian civilians being murdered. Instead, Sadkovich determined that “after
appropriating the crisis and containing the violence, the West let the Yugoslavs rot.”147
A specific lesson for historians is that studies of the past should not distract from the
significance of current events. Historians failed the people of Yugoslavia as a whole by not
speaking out before and after the war broke out. Investigating the role of historians in
Yugoslavia, historian Norman M. Naimark was shocked by how “most historians of the region
retreated from active commentary on events” despite knowing the most about its past, present,
and future.148 Historians already have a difficult job in remaining free from bias in their
research. However, as the most educated on the past of these areas they had the responsibility to
speak out and warn of what had come before and could be again. Knowledge and interest in the
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past should not make one unaware or disinterested in the present and future. Historians
oftentimes are at their best when they can interpret the past in order to better understand the
present and educate and inform others that will impact the future. The international community
could have benefited from such voices prior to making decisions.
Another lesson for policy makers in the future will be to surround themselves with
individuals that have knowledge of the histories and cultures of the people their decisions will
affect. The world is a diverse place made up of even more diverse people. Understanding and
appreciating the differences that exist between one’s own culture and those of others will lead to
healthier interactions between people.
The final lesson is that the United States and other Western powers must humble
themselves by admitting that their way of doing things is not always the best model. Bosnia
suffered, and continues to suffer, in part because of the arrogance of the U.S. and UN. By failing
to acknowledge Bosnia’s history or culture as a relevant part of the process, the international
community responded slowly to the collapse of Yugoslavia and next pursued a biased agenda in
terms of how they saw the country being put back together after the war. Future state-building
efforts must take into account the differences that other countries possess. In doing so, it will
become possible to achieve stability more quickly as investigated and educated decisions are
made. Thus, it will be important for future generations of foreign policy makers to learn from
the mistakes of their predecessors and approach future regional conflicts with sensitivity and a
desire to learn from the groups involved. However, they must also be prepared to act with
firmness and take risks in leadership if they desire see their actions achieve success.
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Conclusion
Despite never resolving the grievances of World War II, Yugoslavia had made great leaps
towards peaceful coexistence in a heterogeneous state. “Yugoslavia’s 1981 census recorded
about 640,000 ethnically mixed marriages, often made between Serbs and Croats despite the
hostilities that have dominated relations between the two groups for decades”149 Yet this seemed
to matter little to individuals like Tudjman, Milosevic, and other leaders in the republics who
saw the world around them as they wanted to. While still in the diplomatic stage of
disagreement Tudjman insisted that “we have had enough experience to show us that no other
form of government can exist here because Serbs and Croats belong not only to two different
nationalities, but to two different cultural spheres.”150 Statements like these reflected a posture
of already having given up on coexistence. The population dynamics of these republics reflected
something more hopeful, however. This would be the case even after war broke out. When war
spread to Bosnia, much of the ethnically diverse population suffered together. “Close to 80,000
Serbs shared the siege of Sarajevo with their Croat and Muslim neighbors. Indeed, throughout
the war thousands fought and died for the idea of a multinational, cosmopolitan, pluralist
society—an idea Bosnia embodied for centuries.”151
Unfortunately, once events have occurred there is nothing that can be done to change
them. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was not immediate, just as the war which spread to Bosnia
did not begin overnight. The progression towards war was a gradual one. Even after war broke
out, there was time for the international community to step in and respond. Instead, the war was
allowed to rage on for four years leading to thousands of lives being cut short. Startlingly,
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“genocide occurred after the Cold War; after the growth of human rights groups; after the advent
of technology that allowed for instant communication; after the erection of the Holocaust
Museum on the Mall in Washington, D.C.”152
As the world continues to change, the UN, NATO, the EU, the U.S. and all other nations
and collaborations of nations will have to change with it. The timid way in which the UN,
NATO, the EC and the U.S. acted did not fit the Bosnian War. Different approaches must be
taken when negotiations fail or stall, and the UN allowed too much time to pass before moving
on to new and firmer actions against known aggressors. That time is what allowed thousands of
Bosnian citizens to die and revealed the UN to be weak and unwilling to act. The U.S., and
specifically the Bush and then Clinton administrations, became complicit to the UN’s inaction by
not reasoning harder with those in charge in the UN, or more simply, not being interested enough
to really care what was happening in former Yugoslavia. Unilateral action would never have
worked, and the U.S. and other countries have seen what can happen when they choose to take
the burden entirely on themselves. However, injustices were taking place with the full
knowledge of the nations that held positions as peacekeepers in Bosnia, and they continued for
nearly four years without significantly being checked. Genocide again transpired on Europe’s
soil, and the leaders of the intervening international bodies allowed it to happen. Little appeared
to have changed since the 1940s as international leaders again practiced appeasement when
negotiating with determined men driving questionable agendas.
In conclusion, the UN, NATO, and the U.S. failed to successfully bring about a swift end
to the Bosnian War which allowed Europe to experience genocide once more on its soil. Though
prepared to intervene in regional conflicts and possessing the means to act with strength, the
international community, especially its European members, lacked unity and the resolve to
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punish the aggressors. Thus, hostilities escalated without restraint, and the intervention was
initially rendered impotent. Changes in leadership, tactics, and the tragedy at Srebrenica
eventually led to a strong, united international effort to turn back the aggressors and force a
peace, but by that time hundreds of thousands were dead and millions were displaced. The
Dayton Peace Accords brought peace to the region, but the dream of heterogeneity in Bosnia had
largely been crushed. Therefore, the intervention in Bosnia was largely a failed effort with its
only success being that it eventually ended the war.
Bosnia’s importance now resides in its place in history as an event which can be learned
from in order to ensure that other such conflicts never happen again. “The war in Bosnia took a
terrible toll, both on the people of that small country and on the international institutions whose
intervention efforts were so problematic. Nothing can change that history. But by better
understanding what happened, and specifically by bringing the tools of science to bear (in
addition to the more common methods of journalism and history), we hope to contribute to the
better management of future regional conflicts.”153 Sadly, mistakes have continued to be made
by both the U.S. and U.N. in recent years, and terrible tragedies continue to occur around the
world, yet there is still hope for change. More “Daytons” can come to pass. If the nations that
desire peace truly investigate the positive and negative realities of their decisions in the past and
the history and culture of the places they continue to impact in an effort to move forward, then
they will achieve more positive results in future engagements. Perfection will never be
achievable in resolving conflicts, nor should it be expected, but the humble pursuit of
understanding those affected and where they have come from must become an integral part of
policy making. There is much still to learn from what occurred in the dissolution of Yugoslavia

153

Goldstein, 528.

74

and the Bosnian War, and perhaps a most sincere hope for those who make decisions is that they
will begin to take responsibility for their actions and be willing to learn from the past and take
risks for their future. In reality, the Bosnian War is still influencing leaders’ ideologies when it
comes to international bodies inserting themselves into national conflicts and it will continue to
be used that way for years to come.
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